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Following the prospective unification of Korea, presumably under Seoul’s 
guidance, the government would face the choice between policies of alignment and 
nonalignment with each major Pacific power.  This choice will be influenced by 
historical predispositions, the path of reunification, Korea’s domestic situation, and its 
relations with each power.  As long as the present North Korean threat continues to 
plague the political and security considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no other 
viable alternative than the U.S.-ROK security alliance.  However, after the elimination of 
the North Korean threat, a unified Korea will be able to redefine its foreign policy 
options.  Currently, given the predominance of the ongoing war on terrorism, the foreign 
policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington.  This 
permits the People’s Republic of China to play a larger role in the reunification process, 
which could predispose a unified Korea to tilt toward China.  In order for the United 
States to anticipate and prepare for this event, this thesis analyzes foreign policy options 
of a unified Korea and the possible political, economic, and military ramifications within 
the realm of international relations that could conceivably occur with the unification of 
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 This thesis examines the influence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the United States on a possible post-unified Korean state.  For these purposes, the thesis 
assumes the long-term inevitability of a unified Korean peninsula under a single 
government.  In addition, it recognizes that the particular path of reunification may affect 
the foreign policy orientation of the resulting unified Korean regime.  The scenarios 
presented offer a construct of possible political, economic and military ramifications 
within the realm of international relations that could conceivably occur with the 
unification of North and South Korea.  
Since the creation of Choson in the 4 Century B.C., the first Korean tribal 
kingdom in history, China has continuously influenced Korean affairs.  Due to the geo-
strategic location of Korea, placed between the great powers of Russia, Japan, and China, 
the Koreans have suffered repeated invasions throughout history.  However, of all of the 
major powers, China had by far the greatest influence and was the most acceptable to 
Koreans.  Sinic influence remained prominent through the first Korean unification of 688 
A.D., and lasted until Japan subjugated Korea in 1910.  China’s role in the Second World 
War against Japan was influential in shaping postwar expectations regarding Korea.  
Unfortunately, the postwar era led to the creation of a bifurcated peninsula in 1945.     
Throughout the Cold War, the PRC maintained a strong level of influence over 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), despite occasional tensions in their 
bilateral relations.  The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960’s forced the DPRK to vacillate 
between the Soviet Union and the PRC, occasionally leaning toward Moscow but more 
often leaning toward Beijing.  Even to this day, the PRC is one of the few countries that 
continuously exerts influence over the domestic and foreign policy of the DPRK.  Kim 
Jong Il’s two visits to the PRC in 2001 again illustrated the durability of their lasting 
relationship.   
While the PRC-DPRK bilateral relationship remained strong during the Cold 
War, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States also grew increasingly closer 
throughout the Cold War.  The alliance between the two was fundamental to the security 
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of the ROK during and after the Cold War.  During this period, the United States played 
the predominant external role in directing and influencing the internal economic and 
political orientation of South Korea.  Many categorized their relationship as a “client-
state relationship,” because the ROK depended on the United States for its very 
existence.  Toward the end of the Cold War, however, the PRC also became an important 
factor in ROK policy-making, even before the establishment of normal bilateral relations 
in 1992. Recently, South Korean leaders actively began to engage China politically, 
economically, and socially.   
In 1992, the normalization of Sino-Korean ties initially focused on the creation of 
a mutually beneficial economic relationship.  Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 
the developing Chinese market, with record-breaking growth and tremendous potential, 
continues to provide an excellent opportunity for South Korea.  As the ROK looks for 
profitable markets, South Korean industries increasingly find the promising Chinese 
market’s potentials to be more attractive than American or Japanese markets where South 
Korea has struggled with the persisting trade deficits.  In addition, in the current 
international political situation, ROK leaders sometimes have found the PRC more 
helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other countries. 
In this context, since the end of the Cold War, the PRC has retained significant 
influence on the DPRK while developing relations with the ROK at the same time.  In 
addition, Beijing has been quite willing to persuade Pyongyang to respond to Seoul’s 
courtship, which turned out to be significantly effective in bringing about the first inter-
Korean summit in June 2000. 
In contrast, the current Bush administration has not been as willing as the Clinton 
administration to actively engage North Korea on terms compatible with President Kim 
Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy.”  In 2000, Washington began a process of attempting to 
normalize relations with Pyongyang, in return for concessions on missile development 
and sales, and the ceasing of its nuclear program.  The current Bush administration 
differentiated its approach from that of its predecessor’s and toughened Washington’s 
stance toward the Kim Jong Il regime.  President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union 
address exemplified Washington’s stance by including North Korea in the “axis of evil.”  
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In addition, since the historic 2000 summit between Seoul and Pyongyang, North Korea 
has continuously blamed the stalled talks with the South on the United States.  Since the 
DPRK recognizes that Washington is not eager to improve relations, it resumed a hard-
line approach against both the United States and the ROK for most of 2001 and early 
2002. 
Recent trends in the PRC also present significant challenges to policymaking in 
Seoul and Washington, and the development of their bilateral alliance.  Given its rising 
economy and military modernization efforts, the PRC is becoming an evident regional 
power and a potential strategic competitor of the United States.  The PRC’s regional 
diplomacy is highlighted by the move to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
the formalization of its ties with Russia through a new friendship treaty, and summit 
exchanges with the DPRK, which signaled Beijing’s interest in continually asserting 
itself as a dynamic security player in Northeast Asia.     
While many authors disagree about the significance of China’s rise as a regional 
economic and military power, most agree that the PRC has become a major consideration 
for the ROK’s policymaking and United States’ regional security interests.  The PRC is 
likely the only other major power with the motives and means to facilitate the 
reconciliation process leading to the reunification of Korea.  For several years, China has 
supplied the DPRK with substantial economic and political support.  Furthermore, China 
has the obvious incentive to avoid instability because it shares a border with Korea.      
The intent of this thesis is to examine the relationship between China and both 
Koreas in order to identify factors that could cause a unified Korea to strengthen its ties 
with the PRC.  The hypothesis to be tested is as follows.  As the world becomes more 
integrated through globalization, there is an increasing recognition among Asian 
countries of the need to strengthen relations within the region.  However, the ongoing 
tension between China and Japan continues to complicate regional politics and security.  
Chinese regional ambitions will actively involve Beijing in the inter-Korean unification 
process in order to promote regional stability and to create a favorable power balance, 
utilizing the unified Korea against the United States and Japan.  In addition, several 
leaders in the DPRK as well as the ROK perceive the current United States policy toward 
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North Korea as a contributing factor to the inability of the Koreas to unify.  As such, a 
continuation of Washington’s current hard-line stance against the DPRK would impede 
the process of reconciliation and may compel a modification of a unified Korea’s foreign 
policy options.  A compilation of all these factors increases the likelihood that a unified 
Korea may seek an alternative alignment with the PRC.     
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions:   
Historically, what factors have affected relations between China and the Koreas? 
What are the different unification paths available for the Koreas?  
What are the main foreign policy options available for a unified Korea? 
What factors may lead to a post-unified Korea aligning with the PRC? 
The relevance of this thesis stems from the vital role the United States has played 
in the security on the Korean Peninsula as well as in Northeast Asia since the end of 
World War II.  Since the United States military presence in the Korean Peninsula 
contributes to the security of Northeast Asia and Korea’s potential alignment with China 
could eliminate the American presence on mainland Northeast Asia, the future of a 
unified Korea is an important United States security consideration.  The removal of an 
American military presence from the Korean peninsula also calls into question the 
viability and Japanese desirability of the United States maintaining troops in Japan; thus 
potentially eliminating an American forward deployed presence from the entire Northeast 
Asian region.    
This thesis will consist of five chapters, including this Introduction.  Chapter Two 
will survey the historical evolution of the relationship between China and Korea.   
Furthermore, it will examine, in this context, the impact of the United States-PRC 
relationship and its influence on the Korean peninsula, as well as the U.S. historical 
relationship with North and South Korea.  Chapter Three will summarize the foremost 
unification paths available for the Koreas to pursue.  The path of reunification and the 
intervention by the four Pacific powers (United States, Russia, China, and Japan) will 
largely determine the foreign policy options of a unified Korean state.  These scenarios 
include unification through peaceful reconciliation, collapse and absorption, military 
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conflict, or external intervention.  Chapter Four will examine several post-unified Korea 
scenarios.  These scenarios include maintenance of the South Korean status-quo alliance 
with the United States following unification, the formation of a security alignment with 
Russia, China, or Japan, and the desire for a unified Korea to become an independent 
regional power.  Furthermore, this chapter will examine the particular factors that could 
lead to a unified Korea aligning with the PRC.  These factors include the changing 
relationship between the Washington and Beijing, the potential for a diplomatic 
separation of Korea from the United States and both Koreas, and the influence of the 
changing regional and global situation on the PRC.  Finally, Chapter Five will offer a 
















































II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Since the Korean peninsula was locked in a postwar geopolitical settlement 
beginning in 1945, it was externally divided, an episode that outlived the Cold War 
rivalry.  The United States and Soviet Union agreed to a shared occupation of the Korean 
peninsula following Japan’s defeat in 1945, resulting in a North-South division and 
eventual coexistence of competing Korean states throughout the Cold War period.  The 
bilateral structure of the Cold War compelled the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south 
to turn away from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), despite Korea’s historical 
affiliation with Chinese dynasties, and look toward the United States as an ally.  
Conversely, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north maintained 
close bilateral ties with the PRC, despite some ideological differences.  Unfortunately, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which ended the Cold War, did not terminate the Cold 
War on the Korean peninsula.  The pursuit of a “Northern Politics” policy by the South 
Korean government and the end of the Cold War facilitated PRC-ROK normalization in 
1992.  The current relationship the PRC has with both the DPRK and ROK enables it to 
play a potential role in the future of the Korean peninsula.  As such, it is important to 
examine the historical ties between China and both Koreas, in conjunction with a Chinese 
interest in regional security and the current United States hard-line stance against the 
DPRK because it may raise a question of what a unified Korea’s foreign policy options 
toward China might be.       
 
A. PRE-WORLD WAR II 
Due to the strategic location of the Korea peninsula among the great powers of 
Russia, Japan, and China, the Koreans have suffered repeated invasions throughout 
Korean history.  These invasions may be categorized into five major periods of foreign 
occupation, including encroachment by China, the Mongols, Japan, and -- following 
World War II -- the United States and Soviet Union.  However, of all of the major 
powers, China had by far the greatest influence and often was more acceptable to 
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Koreans, making Korea the most sinicized non-Chinese state in East Asia.1  In fact, 
Chinese influence on inter-Korean relations was critical in the first unification of Korea 
in 668 A.D., when the Silla kingdom overwhelmed the other two Korean states.2 
Although the Koreans adopted many aspects of Chinese culture, they always 
maintained unique Korean characteristics.  Similar to other countries bordering on the 
Middle Kingdom, the Koreans embraced Chinese culture, paid tribute to the Chinese 
emperor, and received recognition and protection in return.  In the wake of the Japanese 
invasion under Hideyoshi during the sixteenth century, Korea had established a rigid 
policy of excluding foreigners, except for the Chinese and a small Japanese enclave.3  For 
two centuries, Korea maintained itself as the “hermit kingdom,” using its younger brother 
status in relation to China in the Confucian system of East Asia to maintain its isolation 
from the rest of the world.4  The isolationist period in Korea ended forcibly in 1876, after 
Japan sent warships to open Korea to trade.  In 1882, as a diplomatically defensive 
measure against its neighbors, Korea signed a “Treaty of Amity and Commerce” with the 
United States, the first treaty with a Western power, in which America promised to 
provide good offices in case of external threats.5   
The old Korean proverb, “when whales fight, the shrimp in the middle gets 
crushed,” exemplified the Korean peninsula in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century.6    During this period, both Imperial Japan and later Czarist Russia recognized 
Korea as an important strategic area along the rim of China.  Ultimately, the Manchu 
dynasty of China, staggering from internal decay and Western incursions, could not 
shield Korea from a rapidly modernizing Japan or an ever-expanding Russia.7   
                                                 
1 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas:  A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 3. 
2 For further background on the first unification of Korea, see:  Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia:  
The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997).   
3 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas:  A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 4. 
4 William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 13.  
5 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas:  A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 4. 
6 William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 13. 
7 Ibid.     
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Following the opening of Korea in 1876, the Chinese continued to insist on its 
suzerainty over Korea, and Japan sought to overturn it.  In addition, Korean reformers 
began to look toward the Japanese for inspiration and support for liberation.  When an 
anti-foreign mob in Seoul attacked the Japanese legation in 1882, both China and Japan 
responded by sending troops to the aid of the opposing side.  In 1884, a coup attempt by 
Koreans ended with a clash between the Chinese and Japanese.  To calm the situation, 
China and Japan had signed the 1885 Treaty of Tientsin stipulating each nation would not 
station its troops in Korea.  In the event that either decided to do so, it would inform the 
other nation beforehand.  During the next decade, the Japanese became more involved in 
Korea and tried to contain China’s effort to reinforce its privileged position in Korea, 
while the Chinese simultaneously intensified their efforts at modernizing their military 
forces.  In 1894, at the request of the Korean king, China sent a small body of troops, and 
in retaliation, Japan sent in a larger force and demanded reforms of Korea.  On 1 August 
1894, the Chinese and Japanese entered into the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War.8  The 
eventual Japanese victory effectively eliminated China from the Korean peninsula.9 
Following the Sino-Japanese War, Russia felt its interests in East Asia threatened, 
and therefore emerged as a new protector of Korea’s independence, however, to the 
Koreans protection meant exploitation and domination.  After the Russians refused to 
divide the Korean peninsula at the 38th parallel in order to forgo a conflict with Japan, the 
Russians and Japanese entered the 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War, when Japan suddenly 
attacked and defeated Russian forces at Port Arthur and Inchon.  Although Korea 
announced its neutrality, the peninsula found itself occupied by Japanese forces.  A 
combination of factors, including the Japanese alliance with Great Britain in 1902 and 
United States’ neutrality in return for Japan’s assurances it would not threaten the 
American position in the Philippines, enabled the Japanese military to defeat Russia in 
1905.10  Later in the same year, Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic 
interests in Korea were codified in the Treaty of Portsmouth, in which President 
                                                 
8 Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 
1997), 553. 
9 William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 13. 
10 Ibid.    
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Theodore Roosevelt played peacemaker between Russia and Japan, and for which he was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.    Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War put it in a 
position to dominate Korea.              
Following the Russo-Japanese War, Korea felt its first perceived betrayal by the 
United States in 1905 after Secretary of War William Howard Taft approved Japan’s 
domination of Korea.  The agreement was arrived at in secret with the Japanese Prime 
Minister Katsura Taro in return for assurances from Tokyo that it would not challenge the 
American colonial domination of the Philippines.  With no opposition in sight, Korea 
became a Japanese protectorate in 1905 and Tokyo annexed it outright as a Japanese 
possession in 1910.  The Japanese then ruled as harsh colonial masters of the peninsula 
until Japan’s defeat in World War II.11 
During Japanese colonization, Japan increasingly incorporated Korea into its 
empire.  In 1919, a nationwide, unarmed demonstration of the Korean nationalist 
movement took place.  In the hope of impressing the statesmen at Versailles and 
appealing to the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination, Koreans secretly organized 
and launched a protest, demanding freedom.12  Although the independence movement 
failed, it convinced the Japanese colonial authorities they needed to increase their efforts 
aimed at assimilation.13  The Japanese forced the Koreans to take Japanese surnames and 
use Japanese textbooks.  Furthermore, the Korean language press was nearly eliminated, 
and in the late 1930s, use of the Korean language in an official capacity was banned.  By 
the onset of World War II, Koreans were integrated into the Japanese empire, however, 
their identity remained firmly Korean.14       
During World War II, policymakers within the United Stated believed the global 
instability between 1919 and 1939 was derived largely from the failure of the United 
                                                 
11 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 5. 
12 John K. Fairbanks, Edwin Reischauer, Albert Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, rev. 
ed. (Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 909.  
13 William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 14. 
14 John K. Fairbanks, Edwin Reischauer, Albert Craig. East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, rev. 
ed. (Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 911-12. 
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States to assume a responsible position in the world community.15  Since the projected 
defeat of Japan in World War II threatened to provoke another great power rivalry in 
Asia and over the peninsula, the United States displayed a greater interest.  The concern 
for the Korean peninsula grew early in the war as the Nationalist regime in China pushed 
for American recognition of the Korean Provisional Government, then based in China.  It 
appeared to the United States that the pressure represented a Chinese effort to reestablish 
the position it had on the peninsula before the Sino-Japanese War.  In addition, the 
internal condition of Korea due to the years of colonization made it apparently 
unprepared for independence.  It was for this reason during the Allied powers’ 
international wartime conferences between 1943 and 1945 that President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt proposed an international trusteeship for Korea.  The proposed trusteeship, 
which only received partial support, involved multinational participation of the Soviet 
Union, China, Great Britain, and the United States.16     
Following the Cairo Conference of 1943, the joint communiqué issued on 1 
December 1943 contained a statement on Korea that Japan will “be expelled from…all 
territories which she has taken by violence and greed…The aforesaid three great powers, 
mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course 
Korea shall become free and independent.”17  Furthermore, it became clear that World 
War II would not last much longer after the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 
August 1945.  This accelerated the Soviet Union’s declaration of war against Japan on 8 
August 1945.  When Stalin declared war on Japan, Soviet troops occupied the northern 
part of Korea before Japan surrendered to the United States.  A week later, on 15 August 
1945, Japanese Emperor Hirohito announced the unconditional Japanese surrender to the 
Allied powers.   
At Yalta in February 1945, the leaders of the Allied powers had agreed to disarm 
the Japanese troops in Korea, yet did not specify how to do it until the Potsdam 
                                                 
15 William Strueck, The Korean War: An International History (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 17.  
16 Ibid.  
17 Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers, 
1997), 165.  
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conference held between 17 July – 2 August 1945.  Regardless, the Koreans were 
overjoyed after liberation from the Japanese.18 
 
B. GLOBAL COLD WAR 
Following the end of World War II, the United States initially placed a still 
occupied Korea under a temporary multilateral administration in cooperation with other 
great powers, including the Soviet Union, and China.  However, in December 1945, 
while attending a foreign ministerial conference, the United States and Soviet Union 
agreed to a modified version of the trusteeship idea, which only included the two 
superpowers.  The trusteeship failed for several reasons, particularly the inability of the 
two superpowers to agree upon a leader of Korea.  The Soviet Union backed communist 
leader Kim Il Sung, while the United States backed a more democratic Syngman Rhee.19  
The United States operated a full military government while occupying Korea 
between 1945-48.  A group of Koreans established the People’s Republic of Korea (PRK) 
within weeks of Japan’s surrender, not recognized by the Americans.  Instead, the United 
States established a military government in Korea until 1948.  In the North, the Soviets 
allowed local committees of the PRK to operate but increasingly controlled them.20  The 
United States proposed the 38th parallel as a military demarcation line, which was 
accepted by the Soviets.  The United States officials did not consult any Koreans before 
coming to the decision of dividing the Korean peninsula; nor did they consult with the 
British or Chinese, both of whom expected to take part in a trusteeship for Korea.21    A 
hasty decision in Washington created the demarcation line dividing Korea into two 
occupation zones, to prevent the Soviet forces from overrunning all of Korea.22  Due to 
the Soviet-American competition in Northeast Asia following the end of World War II, 
Korea, which was not a formal participant in the war, was the only non-belligerent to 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 166. 
19 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1997), 190. 
20 Ibid., 85. 
21 Ibid., 187. 
22 Kenneth B. Lee, Korea and East Asia: The Story of a Phoenix (Westport, CT:  Praeger Publishers, 
1997), 166. 
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undergo a military occupation.23  Thus, it was the political and ideological differences 
associated with the Cold War that contributed to the division of Korea before the formal 
onset of the global Cold War.  This geographical and ideological division would separate 
the Koreans in the south from continuing its historically based relationship with China 
through most of the Cold War period. 
Kim Il-Sung sensed the strategic importance of a communist victory in China; 
therefore, in early 1947, he began dispatching thousands of Koreans to fight with the 
Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong.  The reinforcements sent by North Korea came 
at a crucial time in the Chinese civil war, following a communist succession of defeats 
and heavy losses, and ultimately contributed to the victory of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP).24  Consequently, and in response to the crossing of the 38th parallel by 
United Nation forces during the Korean War, the Mao government later reciprocated the 
support of the DPRK.   
Starting in early 1947, the United States was unwilling to withdraw troops from 
the Korean peninsula because of its growing importance to Washington’s dual strategies 
of containing communism and reviving the Japanese economy.  However, many in the 
United States continued to balk at a major commitment in Korea.  For this reason, a few 
advisors in Washington utilized the UN in order to reposition and contain North Korea 
through collective security mechanisms.25  The American-dominated United Nations 
(UN) formed the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to observe the 
democratic elections in Korea.  The UNTCOK-observed elections in May 1948 
foreshadowed the final emergence of a separate southern government and thus raised the 
issue of Korea’s permanent division.26  The Soviet Union and North Korea refused to 
participate in the supervised election to unify Korea; therefore, only the South held 
elections.  This democratic election inaugurated the Republic of Korea on 15 August 
                                                 
23 Some Koreans participated in the Japanese Armed Forces during the Pacific War and were used in 
both Korea and Japan to build up the Japanese industry in support of the war effort.  For more in-depth 
information, see Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun:  A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, Inc., 1997), 174-84. 
24 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1997), 239. 
25 Ibid., 210. 
26 Ibid., 187. 
13
1948, led by newly elected Syngman Rhee.  Since 15 August also marked Japan’s defeat 
in World War II, it had added significance.  Subsequently, the government of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea was proclaimed on 9 September 1949, with Kim 
Il Sung as its premier.  
Before the 1950 invasion by North Korea, nine months of battles and guerilla 
fighting occurred along the 38th parallel throughout 1949.27  Upon hearing reports of 
heavy fighting in Korea, the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) dispatched a 
delegation to the peninsula.  The delegation arrived via a South Korean naval vessel, 
guided around by the ROK Army.  After a few days, the UNCOK members returned to 
Seoul, from where they filed a report to the UN blaming the “northern invaders” for the 
trouble, asserting the North Koreans policy aimed to overthrow of the Republic of 
Korea.28  Although it was probable that the North was more to blame, UNCOK failed to 
investigate and report on the provocations conducted by the South. 
Before 1950, Korea had little significance in the contest between the Soviet Union 
and the United States; therefore, neither power very closely supervised its dependent 
government.  In a speech before Washington's National Press Club on 12 January 1950, 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson did not regard South Korea as having any great strategic 
importance, describing a "defensive perimeter of the Pacific" the United States would 
defend, encompassing countries like Japan and the Philippines. Acheson argued that 
Korea was an area of "lesser" interest, susceptible to "subversion and penetration" that 
"cannot be stopped by military means."29  This statement implied that Korea did not have 
intrinsic importance, however, it did have contextual importance to Washington.  
Acheson’s statement, combined with the lack of response by the United States when 
mainland China fell to Communists, contributed to the Korean Communist leaders’ belief 
the United States would not intervene in a Korean civil war.   
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North Korea, in its 25 June 1950 invasion of South Korea, gambled heavily on its 
ability to conquer the southern portion of the peninsula before an effective defense line 
could be established below the 38th parallel.  However, the Soviet Union, the PRC, and 
the DPRK did not believe the United States would intervene, thus no security plans were 
created in the event it did.30  Fortunately for South Korea, four American divisions, forty 
percent of the United States Army’s strength, along with the relatively strong United 
States Fifth Air Force and Seventh Fleet, were all stationed close by, mainly in Japan and 
the Philippines.31  Moreover, President Truman decided quickly to commit American 
forces to the peninsular war, General Macarthur acted swiftly to implement the 
administration decisions, and Secretary of State Acheson quickly rallied troops to 
supplement the American military build-up in defense of South Korea.32     
Truman responded to the Communist attack, largely because he believed an attack 
on Korea was a major test for the policy of containment as laid out in NSC-68, a 
formative document in the Cold War policy of the United States.33  Furthermore, if the 
United States allowed Korea to fall to the Communists, it might send a message to the 
Soviet Union that Americans would not back up its commitments to Western Europe.  
NSC-68, presented to President Truman in April 1950, stated the Soviet Union’s strategic 
and tactical policy was affected by the estimate that the United States was the greatest 
immediate obstacle which stood between the Soviet Union and world domination, and 
was the only power that could release forces to destroy it.  It further stated that Soviet 
domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or 
by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to 
the United States.  Therefore, the Korean War became the political instrument that put 
NSC-68 into effect seventy-two days after the finalization and presentation of the 
directive to President Truman.   
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On the Communist side, there was a continuous distrust between Mao and Stalin, 
however, both supported Kim Il-Sung in his attempt to reunify Korea forcibly.34  The 
Korean War eventually proved to be somewhat beneficial to the Soviet Union because it 
ensured that a possible accommodation between China, and either the United States or 
ROK did not occur.  Furthermore, the Soviets pushed the North-South conflict as a 
strategy within the East-West conflict with the United States during the Cold War.  
Although they were active behind the scenes, Soviet representatives appeared to stay in 
the background, letting the Koreans rule the Pyongyang government.  In actuality, 
Washington was unable to withdraw American troops because it did not have as strong of 
a hold over the South as Moscow had over the North.35   
While the superpowers considered the Korean War a limited war, both North and 
South Korea were fighting an unlimited war, one that demanded the eradication and 
complete elimination of the opposing regime.  Although it appeared the Cold War 
environment dictated the terms of the Korean War and its consequences, in actuality it 
was the superpower rivalry and the fear of escalation that dominated the war.   In many 
respects, the Korean War was a product of clients who had their own agenda and were 
able to manipulate the two superpowers.  This was illustrated by North and South Korean 
rhetoric, which implicitly supported the need to fight any group that threatened Korean 
unity.36  On one hand, South Korea blamed Soviet imperialism and the spread of 
communism for the North Korean invasion.  On the other hand, Kim Il Sung held the 
United States and its “puppet regime” in the South responsible for the division of Korea.  
The Kim Il Sung accusation of South Korea being an American puppet state remained a 
prevalent theme throughout the Cold War, which dissuaded the DPRK in engaging in 
bilateral negotiations with the South.37  Moreover, North Korea attempted to play the two 
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Communist powers against one another to gain support for an attack against the South.  
To strengthen his hand when dealing with Stalin, who feared a Chinese challenge for 
leadership in the Communist world, Kim Il Sung attempted to secure Mao’s blessing for 
a southern invasion.38 
Largely due to General Douglas MacArthur’s success during the Inchon operation 
and the possibility of the UN troops crossing the 38th parallel, on 30 September 1950 
Premier Zhou Enlai proclaimed in a speech the strongest official word yet of possible 
Red Chinese entry into the war, maintaining that the people of China “will not tolerate 
foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely 
wounded by imperialists.”39  However, similar to leaders in Washington, General 
MacArthur discounted this threat as one of many rumors of possible use of force by the 
Communist Chinese.  As such, the decision to cross the 38th parallel was intricately 
linked to miscommunication between both sides.  Communist Chinese leaders 
exaggerated the threat that American troops in North Korea would pose to Chinese 
security.  Moreover, General MacArthur stated “now that we have our bases for our Air 
Force in Korea, if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the 
greatest slaughter.”40  In addition, those who did not underestimate the Chinese strength 
mistakenly believed the intervention was unlikely.              
By October 1950, after heavy casualties on both sides, the North Korean soldiers 
retreated and the South Korean army moved ahead to occupy the North.  After the UN 
troops crossed the 38th parallel, Mao sent Chinese People’s Volunteers to Korea, to fight 
against the United Nations forces moving rapidly toward the Chinese-Korean border.41  
Many Chinese scholars argue that the PRC’s decision to enter the Korean War in October 
1950 was largely based on concern for Chinese national security and a reaction to the 
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imminent threats to the physical security of Chinese territory.  In addition, due to China’s 
economic reconstruction and political consolidation, Beijing did not necessarily want to 
enter the war.  Chinese scholars further believe the American decision to cross the 38th 
Parallel triggered Chinese intervention, which could have been avoided if the UN forces 
did not cross the parallel.42  Other North Korean and Chinese literature argues that China 
did not enter the war as a defensive measure to protect its borders.  Rather, Mao 
determined early in the war that if North Korea faltered, the Chinese had an obligation to 
come to the aid of North Korea because they sacrificed many Koreans in the Chinese 
revolution and anti-Japan resistance.43  Regardless, the Chinese intervention during the 
Korean War again demonstrated Chinese willingness to assert influence on the Korean 
peninsula.     
Secretary of State Acheson, Warren Austin, the United States ambassador to the 
UN, and several other American policymakers worked successfully behind the scenes in 
getting eight friendly nations, led by the United Kingdom, to sponsor a resolution 
changing the UN’s objective in the war.  Since late June 1950, the objective had been to 
restore the status quo antebellum on the peninsula.  On 7 October 1950, a resolution 
passed calling for appropriate action to ensure the conditions of stability throughout 
Korea and the holding of elections under the auspices of the UN, for the establishment of 
a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea.  
While three UN resolutions had passed between 1947-49 calling for unity, freedom and 
democracy in Korea, this one appeared to commit the UN to achieving unification by 
force, which it obviously failed to do.44   
The United States called the action of China a “fresh and unprovoked aggressive 
act following the beginning of the Sino-Korean offensive.”45  Unlike the support 
provided by Stalin, the Chinese were ready to fight down the middle of the peninsula in 
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support of the DPRK.  After another two years of bloody fighting, accompanied by 
several threats by the United States regarding the potential use of atomic weapons, the 
fighting ceased on 27 July 1953.  On that date, the United States, North Korea, and China 
signed an armistice agreement, however, South Korea refused to sign.  The armistice 
created a “demilitarized zone” across the middle of Korea, which currently exists. With 
no peace treaty signed, the two Koreas remained technically still at war; only the 
armistice agreement and demilitarized zone kept a tenuous peace.  Both Koreas watched 
as the war ravaged their country and turned the expectation of a unified Korea into a 
nightmare.46  The war devastated both Koreas, damaging the infrastructure and cities, 
wiping out ten percent of the Korean population, fifteen percent of the GDP in the South, 
and thirty percent in the North.47      
The PRC’s entrance into the Korean War effectively heightened the country’s 
stature in relation to the DPRK and propelled the Chinese to a position of influence in 
North Korea similar to the Soviet Union.  In November 1953, Kim Il Sung led a large 
delegation to Beijing, where he negotiated agreements for long-term military, economic, 
and cultural cooperation with the northern neighbor.  Kim gave thanks for the 
“magnificent contributions to the Korean War, which will remain immortal as Korea’s 
rivers and mountains.”  In response, the Chinese treated the manpower and material 
provided to North Korea as gifts and promised $200 million in aid for reconstruction 
during the next several years.48   
The Geneva Conference of 1954 convened to address several issues, including the 
issue of Korean unification.  The British proposed a plan that called for an internationally 
supervised election by the entire Korean peninsula to establish a new all-Korean 
government.  After the elections, the American and Chinese troops would withdraw from 
Korea.  Under this proposal for unification, the status quo within Korea would be 
maintained, presumably with Rhee remaining president.  However, the ROK government 
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violently opposed any concessions to the Communists and fought for the withdrawal of 
Chinese troops and the surrender of North Korea.  President Rhee claimed he did not 
support the elections held in the South because they went against the constitutional 
processes of the government.  Rather, President Rhee attempted to obtain American-UN 
backing of an offensive against the communists to finally expel them from the peninsula.  
Ultimately, they were not able to reach a settlement of the Korean issue; therefore, the 
ROK and DPRK governments had to accept a temporary division of the peninsula.49  The 
end of the Korean War marked the integration of Korea into the Cold War system.50 
Following the division of Korea and subsequent war, the DPRK became a 
divergent case of postwar Marxist-Leninist ideology, witnessing a profound reassertion 
of native Korean political practices that encompassed an elevation of the role of the 
leader and a policy of self-reliance.  In addition, contrary to Western belief during the 
Cold War, the Soviet Union competed with Chinese influence in the DPRK, and both 
conflicted with the North Korean indigenous ideology.51  Kim Il Sung systematically 
played the PRC and USSR against one another throughout the Cold War, securing 
millions in economic and military aid, and trade subsidies.52   
Despite some divergence in their bilateral relations, the PRC maintained a strong 
level of influence and maintained a warm official friendship with the North Korean state 
throughout the Cold War.  The Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s forced the DPRK to 
vacillate between the two countries, occasionally leaning toward Moscow, but more often 
leaning toward Beijing.  In 1970, prior to the opening of China to the United States and 
Japan, Premier Zhou Enlai declared that “China and Korea are neighbors linked by 
mountains and rivers…This friendship cemented in blood was forged and has grown in 
the course of the protracted struggle against our common enemies, United States and 
Japanese imperialism…Common interest and common problems of security have bounds 
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and united our people together.”53  Even during the period of self-reliance in China, 
Beijing still maintained a close relationship with the DPRK.  
In contrast to the DPRK’s relationship with the other communist regimes, 
American influence penetrated into every branch of the South Korean administration 
after the establishment of the ROK, supported by U.S. dollars.54  Many categorized their 
relationship as a “client-state relationship,” because the ROK depended on the United 
States for its very existence.55  Throughout the Cold War period, the ROK continued a 
strong alliance with the United States, while increasing its multilateral ties with other 
countries.  Moreover, following entering into the Armistice Agreement, the United States 
and South Korea signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on 1 October 1953, creating a formal 
security alliance.56    
The DPRK-PRC relationship throughout the Cold War remained relatively strong.  
The nature of the alliance between the DPRK and PRC was illustrated in 1979, after 
Deng Xiaoping told President Carter that North Korea “trusts” China and that “we cannot 
have contact with the South or it would weaken that trust.”  However, the ROK was 
eventually able to break through the alliance.  The first crack in the political firewall 
between the PRC and ROK occurred in 1983, after a Chinese airliner was hijacked by 
Chinese citizens and forced to fly to South Korea.  Despite protests by the North Korean 
leaders, Beijing sent an official delegation to Seoul, where the two countries smoothly 
negotiated a deal for the return of the plane and its passengers.57  During October of the 
same year, a terrorist bomb in Ragoon, Burma took out much of the South Korean 
cabinet and narrowly missed the then South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.  A 
Burmese court determined the North Koreans were behind the bombing.58  The Ragoon 
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bomb incident increased the Chinese fear of North Korea again attacking the South.59  
While the relations between the ROK and PRC began to improve during this period, 
United States relations with North Korea, hindered by the Ragoon bombing incident, 
showed no signs of improvement.   
Throughout the 1980s, South Korea and China developed bilateral economic 
relations by using the route through Hong Kong.60  The progression of total trade 
between the PRC and ROK increased from $187,906 in 1980 to $1,486,612 in 1987.61  
By 1987, the ROK’s trade with China was valued at three times the level of Chinese trade 
with the North.62  South Korea had its own economic and security interests in pursing 
relations with China.  During the late 1980s, the size of the South Korean economy more 
than doubled that of the North.63  Toward the end of the Cold War, under President Roh 
Tae-woo, South Korea successfully developed “Nordpolitik,” based on West Germany’s 
Ostpolitik, in order to cultivate relations with the DPRK, PRC and Soviet Union.  
Specifically, President Roh stated that “I will approach the Communist bloc more 
vigorously in order to realize peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea and 
ultimately peaceful unification.64  President Roh offered three reasons for the emphasis 
and implementation of this northern policy.  First, increased ROK ties with the PRC and 
USSR would provide an opportunity to resolve the question of national reunification 
between the two Koreas.  Secondly, the policy would facilitate the movement of South 
Korea beyond its peripheral status within Asia in order to assume a prominent role in the 
center stage of the international community.  Finally, the northern diplomacy would 
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economically strengthen South Korea.65  Following the end of the Cold War, this 
eventually resulted in the signing of the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, 
and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea” on 13 December 1991, 
the “Joint Press Communiqué on the Occasion of President Roh Tae Woo’s State Visit to 
the PRC,” dated 30 September 1992, and the “Treaty on Basic Relations,” between the 
ROK and Russia, dated 19 November 1992.66   
 
C. END OF THE COLD WAR 
The termination of Sino-Soviet tension in 1989 eliminated the Chinese fear that 
stronger relations with the ROK would push the DPRK into the arms of the Soviet Union.  
Moreover, Beijing saw the potential domestic political gain in establishing diplomatic 
relations with Seoul, because it would force South Korea to terminate official relations 
with Taiwan.  Moreover, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and 
ROK was economically beneficial to the developing markets of both countries.  It was for 
these reasons that early in the post-Cold War era, and against the wishes of the DPRK, 
China decided to support the entrance of South Korea in the UN, which compelled the 
North to join, both of which occurred on 17 September 1991.67  Finally, in 1992 the 
ROK-PRC laid their Cold War animosities to rest and normalized their relations.     
Despite student demonstrations calling for the removal of United States bases, the 
South Korean government remained under the protection of the security treaty and 
militarily dependent upon the United States to cope effectively with the largest threat 
facing them, the North Korean threat of war.  However, the ROK continued the trend of 
greater independence from the United States with the establishment of multilateral 
economic and security ties.  Since the establishment of its northern policy, the ROK 
government continued to enhance its efforts at establishing and strengthening economic, 
military and diplomatic relations with various countries.  As such, the security 
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environment in the region required a flexible approach to develop cooperative military 
relations with the neighbors of South Korea, anchored on the existing axis of the ROK-
U.S. alliance.68   
During the 1990s, an increase in the internationalization of Korea occurred due 
to the issue of North Korea’s nuclear option, which threatened the security of Northeast 
Asia.  In December 1991, pressure stemming from the PRC, the ROK’s northern 
diplomacy, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, coupled with the United States’ 
objective to remove all nuclear weapons from the peninsula, facilitated the DPRK and 
ROK in signing an “Agreement of Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges and 
Cooperation.”  Although the nuclear issue was not included in the agreement, at the end 
of December both sides agreed not to test, manufacture, produce, received, possess, 
store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.69   
In 1992, during a period of mutual accommodation, the ROK canceled its Team 
Spirit exercise with the United States, which led to an International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) inspection of Yongbyon, North Korea.  Unfortunately, the 1992 
proposed nuclear inspection was unproductive.  Later in 1993, the IAEA discovered that 
the DPRK tried to conceal nuclear material, and Pyongyang denied the IAEA access at 
Yongbyon, upon which the ROK declared the launching of a new Team Spirit exercise.  
North Korea ultimately threatened to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which it signed in 1985, citing the escape clause in the treaty on defending 
supreme national interests.70  IAEA Director General Hans Blix presented a report on 
North Korea to the UN General Assembly in November 1993, which resulted in a vote of 
140 to 1 urging the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the IAEA.  Only Pyongyang 
dissented; China abstained.71  Through the next several months, American-North Korean 
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tensions on the peninsula increased seriously.  Furthermore, inter-Korean negotiations 
over the implementation of the North-South denuclearization accord were broken off by 
North Korea, arguing that the nuclear issue should be resolved only through bilateral 
talks with Washington, not with South Korea or the IAEA.72   
Former President Jimmy Carter received permission from the Clinton 
administration and traveled to Pyongyang for a meeting with Kim Il Sung.  As a result, a 
third round of United States-North Korean talks opened on 8 July 1994, but was cut short 
by Kim Il Sung’s death.73   The Geneva Accords talks resumed on 5 August 1994, which 
produced an agreement to resolve the differences on the North Korean nuclear program 
between the United States and the DPRK on North Korea’s nuclear program.  The 
essence of the deal was that the United States would provide North Korea with a light-
water reactor, arrange for interim energy alternatives for the DPRK, and work to reduce 
barriers to trade and investment to improve the North Korean economy.  In response, 
North Korea agreed to freeze construction of its nuclear activities.74  During the next 
month, the technical details of the agreement were hammered out, and the Geneva 
Accord talks resumed on 23 September 1994.75  Finally, after seventeen months of on-
and-off negotiations, the Carter deal and the White House response formed the basis of 
the “Agreed Framework” between the United States and the DPRK, signed on 21 October 
1994 at Geneva after talks held between September-October 1994.76       
Since North Korea is a close neighbor to China, the Chinese were also concerned 
over the nuclearization of North Korea.  As such, the Chinese played a large, behind the 
scene role in effecting the Geneva Accords of August and October 1994 between the 
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United States and DPRK.  For the most part, China has been cooperative with the United 
States in attempting to restrain North Korea’s nuclear weapon and ballistic missile 
development.  In fact, one argument made by the Clinton administration regarding close 
Sino-American ties was based on Beijing’s positive role as an interlocutor with 
Pyongyang.77  However, China supported dialogue and was against the imposition of 
sanctions on North Korea.  The PRC argued that peaceful dialogue was the only way to 
obtain a political solution with North Korea concerning nuclear weapons.  The aim of the 
Chinese policy was to bring about a relaxation of the situation and ultimately the 
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  China’s stated intent was enhance the security 
of Northeast Asia by helping North Korea become more involved in international affairs, 
as had the PRC, in order to develop its economy and improve the living conditions of its 
people.78 
The Chinese involvement during the nuclear crisis on the peninsula demonstrates 
that while the PRC-DPRK relationship remained strong, Chinese interests on the 
peninsula were mixed.  China has a formal alliance with North Korea, however, the 
Chinese refused to allow it to dictate their policies toward South Korea.  This was 
demonstrated by the rising importance of the ROK as one of the Chinese economic 
partners following formal recognition in 1992.    Additionally, China did not support the 
DPRK in the potential nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.  However, the PRC was 
also against sanctions imposed on the DPRK by the United States.  
While the relationship between China and South Korea remained strained 
throughout the Cold War, since normalization in 1992 their bilateral ties have 
dramatically improved.  Currently the South Koreans view China as more of an economic 
challenge than a military threat.  Furthermore, South Koreans heavily favor active ROK-
PRC interactions, and overwhelmingly view China as a positive economic and diplomatic 
force on the Korean peninsula.79  Recently, South Korean leaders actively began to 
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engage China on several levels.  In 1997, Asia experienced sharp economic reversals, 
triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997.  Following the Asian financial 
crisis, the developing Chinese market, with record-breaking growth and tremendous 
potential continues to provide an excellent opportunity for South Korea to relieve its IMF 
bailout situation.  As the ROK looks for profitable markets, South Korean industries find 
the promising Chinese market increasingly more attractive than American or Japanese 
markets, where South Korea has struggled with the persisting trade deficits.80  The 
increased strength of the PRC-ROK economic relationship was again exemplified in 
2001, as direct investment in China by South Korea rose in 2001, while dropping in the 
United States over the same period.81  Hyundai Motor, one of the South Korean corporate 
giants, plans to invest $250 million in a joint-venture manufacturing plant near Beijing.82  
In addition, in the current international political situation, South Korean leaders often 
have found the PRC more helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other 
countries.  As part of the Chinese attempt for regional security, Beijing has taken a 
proactive role in maintaining inter-Korea peace, especially by encouraging North Korea 
to adopt the Chinese style of multilateralism.    
Following President Kim Dae Jung’s inauguration in 1997, he implemented his 
North Korean policy called the “sunshine policy”.  The primary goal of the sunshine 
policy was peaceful coexistence, eventually leading to ultimate reunification. The three 
principles President Kim laid out as a foundation for his policy were:  no tolerance of 
military provocation by North Korea, no attempt by South Korea to absorb the North, 
and an active promotion by the South of reconciliation and cooperation with the North. 
In another aspect of the sunshine policy, President Dae Jung urged both the United States 
and Japan to proceed with their respective rapprochement with the DPRK without having 
to consider inter-Korean relations as a necessary condition.83  The intent of the sunshine 
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policy was to increase confidence between the two countries and improve the political 
and economic conditions of the DPRK by reducing military tension and increasing 
economic and social exchanges.   
Currently South Koreans still maintain support for the underlying principal of the 
sunshine policy, which called for the ROK to embrace and support the DPRK in order to 
build trust and peace.  However, many argue the national interests of the ROK should not 
come second to the policy.  Furthermore, the Kim Dae Jung administration’s perceived 
appeasement toward North Korea decreased the efficacy of the sunshine policy to critics 
because it has come to lack adaptability to reality, flexibility, and efficiency.84 
The implementation of the sunshine policy and subsequent break-through in 
North-South dialogue again demonstrated the importance of Korean reconciliation to the 
ROK, as illustrated by the meeting of President Kim Dae Jung and General Secretary 
Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang in June 2000.  At the summit, the region’s past tensions 
seemed to give way to a new cooperation.  This historic summit was the first meeting of 
the leaders of the two countries since the end of the Korean War.85  The Chinese played 
a large behind-the-scene role in the orchestration of the summit.  Within a little more 
than two months, North and South Korea agreed to build roads and railways across the 
DMZ, re-establish a liaison office in a village in the DMZ, and complete a series of 
visits between family members, an event that has not occurred for nearly fifty years.86 
In some respects, China encouraged North-South dialogue as a countermeasure to strong 
influence by the United States on the Korean peninsula.  The Chinese believed the 
ramifications of the inter-Korean summit would likely alter the dynamics of Northeast 
Asia’s geopolitical balance.  Furthermore, many in South Korea hold the view that the 
ROK government should utilize the PRC and Russia to coax North Korea to participate 
as a member of international society, and to encourage it to adopt a flexible response 
                                                 
Strategic Studies,  August 2001), 4. 
84 Song Chin Hok, “No Sunshine on a One-Way Street,” Joong Ang Ilbo [Online], dated 11 Jul 2002, 
available from:  http://english.joins.com/article.asp?aid=20020711103239&sid=G00, Internet; accessed 14 
Aug 2002.    
85 “Kim Dae Jung:  Nobel Peace Prize Laureate,”  The Nobel Prize Archive [Online], available from:  
http://almaz.com/nobel/peace/2000a.html, accessed 14 Aug 2002.  
86 Kent E. Calder, “The New Face of North East Asia,” Foreign Affairs, (January/February 2001), 
106-7. 
28
toward the resumption of North-South and DPRK-US dialogue.  In this aspect, the ROK 
government continuously maintains bilateral ties with each of the four major powers, in 
order ease tension and establish peace on the Korean peninsula.87 
Under the Clinton administration, the United States was poised for a breakthrough 
with North Korea. The Clinton administration strongly engaged the DPRK at the end of 
his tenure, as illustrated by several high-level visits between the two countries.  
Washington began a process of attempting to normalize relations with Pyongyang in 
return for concessions on missile development and sales, and the ceasing of its nuclear 
program.  President Clinton seemed to be prepared to meet North Korean leader Kim 
Jong Il in December 2000 and hammer out an accord to compensate the isolated state for 
curtailing its missile program.  This was again demonstrated by Secretary Madeline 
Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in October 2001.  During the visit, Kim Jong Il offered to 
curb missile defense in exchange for foreign aid to compensate for lost income from 
missile exports.88  However, due to the debacle surrounding the 2000 presidential 
election results, pre-negotiations broke down and the Clinton visit never occurred.  Since 
the inauguration of the current Bush administration, the relationship between the United 
States and the DPRK abruptly changed.       
Currently, the PRC is one of the few countries that regularly exerts influence over 
the domestic and foreign policies of the DPRK.  Since the end of the Cold War, the PRC 
has retained significant influence on the DPRK while developing relations with the ROK 
at the same time.  In addition, Beijing has been quite willing to persuade Pyongyang to 
respond to Seoul’s courtship, which turned out to be significantly effective in bringing 
about the June 2000 inter-Korean summit.  Kim Jong Il again illustrated the durability of 
their lasting relationship in 2001 after his two visits to the PRC.  Although Kim discussed 
various issues with Chinese leaders, one focus of his visit was to examine China's 
economic reforms. While in China, Kim paid visits to the Shanghai stock market, and 
branches of foreign-invested joint ventures.   Following the visits, Kim reportedly began 
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to consider adopting market-style economic reforms and opening the North Korean 
economy.  However, many hard-line critics argue that Kim was only taking these 
measures to preserve his autocratic rule, and that liberal democracies should refuse to 
deal with Pyongyang.89  Therefore, only time will tell how and if North Korea will be 
able to implement and sustain market reforms. 
Since the historic 2000 summit between Seoul and Pyongyang to the present, 
North Korea has continuously blamed the stalled talks with the South on the United 
States.  The current Bush administration has not been as willing as its predecessor to 
engage North Korea actively, differentiating its approach by toughening Washington’s 
stance toward the Kim Jong Il regime.90  Professor Ko Yu Hwan, Tongguk University, 
argued that the United States, following the inauguration of President Bush, was a 
contributing factor to the breakdown of relations between North and South Korea.  He 
stated the demonstration of “skepticism” by the United States about the North Korean 
leader, the pursuit of a hard-line policy against North, the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attack, and the war on terror all served to amplify North Korea’s sense of crisis.91  
Furthermore, President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union address exemplified 
Washington’s stance by including North Korea in the “axis of evil,” as part of the United 
States-led global war on terrorism.92  Since the DPRK recognizes that Washington is not 
eager to improve relations, they resumed a hard-line approach against both the United 
States and the ROK.93   
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After the “axis of evil” speech, the United States and ROK views on inter-Korean 
reconciliation continue to diverge, as strong criticism arose from South Korea.  One view 
expressed by many South Koreans concerned the inconsistency of United States policy, 
especially in the Cold War era in comparison to recent events.  Specifically, during the 
Cold War, South Korea suffered several terrorist attacks by North Korea, however, 
Washington called for “self-restraint” on the part of Seoul as not to disrupt the East-West 
détente.  During the war on terrorism, similar to the United States during the Cold War, 
many South Koreans cautioned Washington not to overreact in its interaction with North 
Korea.94  While the United States-ROK relationship became more strained when dealing 
with inter-Korean issues, the relations between the ROK and the PRC continued to 
improve.95   
In response to this new hard line approach, North Korea appeared to not only pull 
away from negotiations with the United States, but also derailed ongoing efforts to 
reconcile with South Korea.  However, North Korea did maintain the moratorium on 
missile launches that it declared in 1999 and continued to abide by the Agreed 
Framework, still the only recent agreement it has with the United States. Late in the 
summer of 2001, the Bush administration attempted to revive negotiations by dropping 
its preconditions, but North Korea did not respond.  In the spring of 2002, the Bush 
administration asserted that it would not certify North Korea as abiding by the 1994 
agreement designed to freeze its nuclear weapons program.96  Unfortunately, the reality 
is that North Korea perceives the United States’ first strike nuclear policy and the 
conventional force presence in the South as a potential threat to its survival.  
Additionally, even to this day both the United States and North Korea have been slow in 
honoring the key provisions of the 1994 freeze agreement.  Therefore, if Washington and 
Seoul want North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons option, they must be prepared 
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to create a common negotiating position capable of persuading North Korea to forgo that 
option.   The principal question then becomes how likely is a compromise between North 
Korea and the United States and how will it affect the overall relationship between the 























III. PATHS TO UNIFICATION 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the division of Korea ceased to be an 
imperative dictated by the logic of a greater global struggle.  However, the Korean 
peninsula remained divided.  Conditions in North Korea have increased its diplomatic 
isolation and mounting economic problems, and call into question the state’s continued 
viability.97  External involvement within the unification process, either working in 
support of peaceful unification or acting as a hindrance, will subsequently shape each 
state’s respective relationship with a post-unified Korean state.  The United States, more 
than any other state, can work to ensure that the unification process will be peaceful and 
that Korea’s subsequent reintegration will succeed.  Regrettably, Washington’s policies 
regarding the Korean peninsula have been plagued by miscommunication and missed 
opportunities.98   
In the absence of American support of reunification, the Korean peninsula will 
look to other countries to provide assistance.  Currently, the PRC is the only other major 
power with both the motives and the means to facilitate the reconciliation process leading 
to the reunification of Korea.  For several years, China has supplied the DPRK with 
substantial economic and political support.  Furthermore, China has an obvious incentive 
to avoid instability because it shares a border with Korea.  In the end, any one of the four 
Pacific powers (United States, China, Japan and Russia) may not be able to object to 
reunification if the two Koreas agree to carry it out peacefully and democratically.  
Therefore, assuming the eventual integration of the Korean peninsula will occur, the pace 
and paths leading to reunification will certainly affect the foreign policy options of the 
new Korean state.    
Following the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers, the events of 
1991-92 in Korea held the promise for an eventual reunification of the peninsula.   
Ensuing from the policy of “northern politics” implemented by President Roh, on 13 
December 1991, North and South Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-
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aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation.99  Furthermore, the acceptance by 
Pyongyang of IAEA inspections and the initiation of high-level talks with Washington 
fostered the hope of normalized relations between the United States and North Korea, one 
that would contribute to the eventual unification of the peninsula.  The reunification of 
Germany in 1992 also inspired South Korea with the hope the peninsula would soon 
reunify peacefully.  Unfortunately, the resistance of the DPRK to IAEA inspections 
halted the conciliatory advances between the ROK and DPRK.  Additionally, the chronic 
economic problems of the DPRK and the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994 increased 
speculation that the door to the unification of Korea would be opened similar to 
Germany, through the collapse of the communist government.  Obviously, the DPRK did 
not collapse.  As time went on, the political, social and economic costs of West Germany 
integrating the East decreased the ROK’s desire for quick reunification, reinforced by the 
ramifications of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.100  Moreover, the unification of 
Germany increased North Korean consternation concerning the perceived desire for 
absorption by the South following a collapse of the Communist regime.       
It would no doubt be preferable if a transformation in the North unfolded 
gradually and free of major violence or internal upheaval, enabling a systematic process 
of peninsular integration and diminished levels of military confrontation.101  The 
sunshine policy implemented by President Kim Dae Jung reaffirmed South Korea’s 
desire for a protracted period of peaceful coexistence between the DPRK and ROK by 
maintaining the status quo of two Korean states in order to forestall the collapse of North 
Korea, build up the North’s economy, and improve relations between the two states.102  
Additionally, the historic June 2000 summit held between North and South Korea 
illustrated the desire for gradual reconciliation and again triggered the hope for peaceful 
reunification of the two Koreas.   
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When evaluating a reunified Korean state’s foreign policy possibilities, it is 
important to examine the different paths leading to reunification due to the complex 
nature of inter-Korean and each Korea’s relationship with the Pacific powers.  While the 
road remains unclear, one thing remains certain: the onset of unification will definitely 
constitute one of the most decisive changes in Northeast Asia since the outbreak of the 
Korean conflict.   
In late 1996, then CIA Director John Deutch testified before the United State 
Senate that the DPRK had three options in the years ahead:  it might “invade the South 
over one issue or another; it could lead over time to some peaceful resolution and 
reunification with the South; or it will collapse internally or implode because of the 
incredible economic problems the country faces.”103  Many different unification 
scenarios exist, however, only four predominant alternatives will be examined within the 
confines of this thesis, drawing mainly on the 1997 RAND Study “Preparing for Korean 
Unification:  Scenarios and Implication.”  While there is a possibility of the DPRK 
maintaining control over the Korean peninsula following reunification, most studies 
agree the maintenance of a state similar to the ROK is far more likely.  Therefore, the 
scenarios examined within this chapter begin with the premise of the North’s integration 
into the South.   
The first two scenarios are the most likely to occur, and therefore, the most 
acknowledged and studied.  The first scenario of peaceful integration occurs through 
conciliatory measures leading to the integration and peaceful unification of the Korean 
peninsula.  The onset of peaceful unification through integration is vastly preferable 
because the transformation of the North would occur gradually and be free of any major 
violence or internal upheaval, enabling a step-by-step process of peninsular 
integration.104  The second scenario of absorption occurs through the collapse of the 
DPRK and the assimilation into the ROK.  Many states in the international community, 
including the United States and the PRC, as well as the Kim Dae Jung administration 
have consistently declared no desire for the South to absorb the North.  However, the 
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instability within the North may act independent of the preferences of the ROK and the 
international community.105  The third scenario -- reunification through conflict -- would 
occur through the onset of an overt military action between North and South Korea.  The 
likelihood of this scenario stems from the continuous investment by North Korea in 
major conventional and nuclear modernization programs, despite the South’s endeavors 
to close the gap in various military capabilities.106  The fourth scenario of external 
intervention examines the possibility of the DPRK’s disequilibrium and the potential 
intervention by foreign powers.            
  
A. INTEGRATION AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION 
For the ROK and the four major Pacific powers, peaceful unification through 
integration would occur through the implementation of confidence-building measures, 
major threat reduction activities, and the onset of comprehensive political and social 
reconciliation between the two Koreas.  However, the acute ideological, political, and 
security animosities in place between the divided Korea for a half-century increases the 
difficulty in integrating the two states.107  Before peaceably creating a unified Korean 
government, the two Koreas will not only have to come to terms politically at the highest 
level, but mutual confidence and agreement must also be reached at all other levels.108    
Additionally, further economic decline of the DPRK would make integration of the two 
Korea’s even more difficult and costly.  As such, the recent overture of Pyongyang to 
incorporate a type of market reform is a significant step toward possible future peaceful 
unification.109  Finally, external intervention by the major powers, especially the United 
States and PRC, influences inter-Korean dynamics, and will ultimately affect the path of 
Korean unification.    
The sunshine policy implemented by South Korean President Kim Dae Jung 
illustrated his desire for peaceful unification by creating a favorable environment in 
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which North Korea can change through dialogue and cooperation with the outside world, 
while still maintaining national security.  The main idea of the sunshine policy can be 
categorized by three elements – peace, reconciliation, and cooperation – and is aimed at 
removing the political and military tension on the Korean peninsula.110  The sunshine 
policy is designed to create a unified Korean state in which democratic ideals are 
guaranteed and a prosperous market economy flourishes by a gradual implementation of 
an integration process.  As stated by Kim Dae Jung, the unification process would ideally 
undergo three steps:  the settlement of peace and reconciliation, establishment of a North-
South confederation, and finally a unified state.111         
During the accommodation and integration phase, peaceful coexistence would 
have to first be established and would subsequently lead to the diminution and 
elimination of North Korea’s military threat to the ROK.112  To achieve this, both states 
must undergo a change in attitudes and assumptions about the other and implement a 
series of steps allowing for structural changes.113  The major distinguishing 
characteristics of the integration phase are agreement and compliance, which are essential 
during and after unification.  Agreement must be reached at all levels of both systems 
before the creation of a functioning unified government can occur.  To do so, both Koreas 
would first have to accept each other as full negotiating partners and as equal legal 
entities before commencing negotiations that would potentially lead to a mutually 
binding political settlement.114        
Politically, this would include adherence to the previously signed South-North 
accords, mutual recognition across political institutions, routinized high-level exchanges 
including summit meetings, and the abrogation of national security and espionage laws 
within both Koreas.  Additionally, it would be essential for the citizens in both Koreas to 
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engage in political activities in North and South Korea.115  The recent overtures made by 
both North and South Korea to reinitiate talks potentially foreshadows eventual 
reconciliation under this scenario.  After nine months of deadlock, ministers of the two 
Koreas held the 7th North-South Ministerial Talks in Seoul between 12-14 August 2002.  
During the talks, the two sides confirmed their willingness to carry out the 15 June 2000 
North-South declaration.  Furthermore, the two states agreed to work toward the signing 
of a military security pact that would lead to the beginning of railway and road 
construction inside the demilitarized zone along the border.116  Following the talks, on 19 
September 2002, North and South Korea opened parts of their heavily fortified border to 
remove land mines, in conjunction with the project to reconnect railways and roads that 
were cut half a century ago.  A cross-border road is scheduled to be reconnected as early 
as November 2002, and a cross-border railway built by the end of the year.117 
Militarily, security measures would have to be implemented, including the 
cessation of diplomatic competition between the two Koreas and of all military activities 
construed as provocative or offensive, the acceptance of prenotification and mutual 
observation of military exercises, and fully verifiable force reductions.  Additionally, 
during the reconciliation process, both governments would need to create and agree to a 
replacement of the 1953 Armistice Agreement with a permanent peace treaty.118  Finally, 
unified security and military policies would have to be implemented under a single 
sovereign entity, which would focus on countering potential regional instability and 
preventing the domination of the region by a single power.119      
Socially and economically, both Koreas would have to increase the freedom of 
movement and travel within and between the two Koreas and abroad, cease government 
censorship and propaganda, and allow citizens of both states to enroll freely in schools 
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and educational institutes.  Furthermore, both Seoul and Pyongyang would need to 
decouple economic exchanges from reciprocal political measures, create constitutional 
and legislative changes that would allow for unconstrained economic activity between 
North and South Korea and make currencies fully convertible between both Koreas.120 
Korean relations with external powers will also play a contributing role in the 
peaceful reunification process.  The relationship between the DPRK and the United 
States has been a fundamental factor affecting bilateral Korean relations and the 
reconciliatory progress.  In order for the North Korean regime to participate in the 
reconciliatory process, the DPRK would have to be allowed unconditional participation 
in the four-party talks, unhindered construction of the light-water reactors under KEDO 
should occur, and full compliance is necessary by both North Korea and the United States 
with the Agreed Framework.  Furthermore, the establishment of diplomatic ties between 
North Korea and both the United States and Japan would play a fundamental role in the 
integration of the Korean peninsula, as seen by the Trilateral Coordination Group 
(TCOG).121  The normalization of Tokyo’s relations with North Korea would potentially 
bring Pyongyang economic aid, expanded trade, private investment flows and end 
Japan’s opposition to North Korean membership in international financial institutions.122  
On 17 September 2002, the Japanese leader, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, paid a 
one-day visit to Pyongyang on in an effort to smooth bilateral relations and possibly pave 
the way to formal diplomatic ties. No Japanese leader had ever visited North Korea and 
previously relations between the two countries have often been rocky.123     
In addition to the United States and Japan, Chinese influence on the peninsula is 
essential to the process of peaceful unification.  The influence of the PRC on the DPRK 
has been prevalent in the media recently, speculating about North Korea adopting market 
reforms similar to China.  The reforms being implemented by Kim Jong Il have been 
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hailed as the most radical blueprint for pro-market economic reform in North Korea’s 
history, and they are essential to decreasing the costs of unification under this scenario.124  
After a half-century of economic control so complete that even cash had fallen into 
disuse, North Korea has begun introducing the most significant liberalization measures 
since the start of communist rule.  After two trips to China and Russia in 2001, Lim 
Dong-won, a South Korean presidential advisor on national security and foreign policy, 
reported that Chairman Kim Jong Il issued directives for the reform of economic 
management.  He further described the move as similar to the early days of China’s 
economic reforms.125   
Operating in his typically secretive manner, Kim Jong Il has issued no major 
statements explaining the changes. However, according to Western diplomats who live in 
Pyongyang, North Korean workers confirm that they have received as much as a 20-fold 
increase in their wages, while prices for commodities, including rice, have increased by 
as much as 30 times since the measures were introduced in July 2002.126  Although 
Chairman Kim has not issued a statement regarding the reforms, Chosun Shinbo, a pro-
North Korean publication in Japan, corroborated the report of changes in North Korea.127  
While the market reforms appear promising, many are skeptical about the similarity of 
policies between the two countries.  One significant difference is the Chinese goal of 
setting aside politics and changing the economy, versus the North Korean goals of 
reform, which are to fix the negative side effects of the state-planned economy.128  Only 
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time will tell how and if North Korea will be able to implement and sustain market 
reforms and how much it will affect the unification of Korea.     
The role of China, motivated by a desire to avoid instability on its border, has not 
only been beneficial in influencing the DPRK’s pro-market economic reforms, but also in 
promoting peaceful integration of the Korean peninsula.  One reason Beijing is interested 
in facilitating improvements on the Korean peninsula and between the DPRK and the 
United States is that it would reduce the urgency with which the Bush administration has 
sought to deploy ballistic missile defenses, a plan opposed by Beijing.  Since the PRC has 
supplied the DPRK with substantial economic and political support for years, it is 
affected by the economic decline in North Korea and is therefore keen on persuading 
Pyongyang to adopt reforms that would make its government less dependent on outside 
aid and create market-oriented reforms.129   
To peacefully integrate the Korean peninsula under this scenario, it is essential for 
both Koreas to find common ground and reach an agreement about a peaceful 
reunification path.  Political, social, military, and economic factors will all contribute to 
the reconciliatory period leading up to unification.  Additionally, international support 
will act as a critical variable for lasting peace on the Korean peninsula and future 
unification.         
 
B. COLLAPSE AND ABSORPTION 
Another plausible scenario leading to the reunification of the Korean peninsula 
occurs through the collapse of the DPRK, defined as the inability of the regime in power 
to maintain effective political, economic, social, and military control, ultimately leading 
to the dissolution of the regime.130  Furthermore, a collapse implies loss of government 
legitimacy and authority, widespread public confusion, the possibility of major civil 
discord, and perhaps a massive humanitarian crisis.131  Under this scenario, a systemic 
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economic failure in North Korea would precipitate the demise of the DPRK political 
structure and thereby end the post-1948 two-state framework in the Korean peninsula.132  
With the end of the Soviet bloc’s aid and subsidized trade and the inability to continue 
playing off the rivalry between the USSR and the PRC, the DPRK’s extraordinarily 
militarized economy went into a tailspin it has yet to recover from.133  The dire food and 
energy shortages North Korea is currently suffering have given rise to the scenario of 
unification centered on the presumed disintegration of North Korea and the absorption of 
a crumbling North by the South.134  On the one hand, the economic difficulties of North 
Korea lead many to believe the collapse of the DPRK is inevitable.135  On the other hand, 
such an implosion seems less likely now than it appeared during the early to mid-1990s, 
as demonstrated by the DPRK regime is staying in power.      
The collapse of the communist regimes across Eastern and Central Europe that led 
to German unification prompted a surge of interest in the possibility of a similar situation 
on the Korean peninsula.136  The German model of unification provides a useful analogy.  
However, there are many fundamental differences between the collapse of East Germany 
and the collapse of North Korea.  Unlike Germany, the two Koreas fought a bloody war 
between 1950-53, creating hostilities on the peninsula that still currently exist.  
Additionally, East and West Germany agreed to simultaneous recognition in 1972, 
permitting full diplomatic relations and a quasi-normal political relationship for nearly 
two decades before unification.  Lastly, when the East German ruling structure collapsed 
in 1990, the possibility of any armed hostilities between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had 
virtually ceased, which is not the case in North Korea.137 
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The unification of Korea under this scenario is not a preferred long-term solution 
for any state involved.  The four Pacific powers all share concerns about the expense of 
keeping a viable Korean economic system afloat following a North Korean collapse, and 
the potential disruption to the current balance of power in Northeast Asia.  Korean 
unification under this scenario would present greater prospects of a regional upheaval 
than in the case of Germany’s unification, bringing tensions centered on the possible 
advent of intense economic and diplomatic rivalry with Japan and the rival historical 
suspicions of China, Russia, and Korea.138  Domestically, since the South Korean 
economy was hit hard by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, and required massive 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the ROK’s vulnerability has also 
slowed its desire for rapid national unification.139     
Undoubtedly, Kim Jong Il does not view unification through a collapse of the 
North Korea as a favorable option. Pyongyang views the historical example of German 
unification following the end of the Cold War as fraught with major risks to the survival 
of the North Korean regime.  As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union following the 
implementation of the perestroika policy is not an endorsement for North Korea on the 
virtues and benefits of a North Korean-style perestroika.140  Additionally, the North 
Korean dilemma, at least hypothetically, is that a fundamental transformation can occur 
only in the context of a sweeping regime change.  Obviously, the current leadership under 
Kim Jong Il is unlikely to choose that path.  Therefore, fundamental structural changes in 
North Korea would most likely not occur until all other policy options are exhausted and 
a systemic atrophy reaches unmanageable levels.141       
The decisive factor leading to a collapse in North Korea would likely be 
economic, and the catalyst will be acute disaffection or pressures for change from 
somewhere or someone on top of the system.  However, the desire for economic reform 
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is not the only vehicle for removing Kim Jong Il from power.  A discontented leadership 
within the Korean People’s Army (KPA) could also act as a vehicle in which to remove 
the current North Korean regime by pooling its resources together to remove Kim from 
power.142  Likewise, if a reversal of the DPRK’s economic crisis does not transpire, 
another possibility leading to the collapse of the regime would occur through the ousting 
of Kim Jong Il by members of the elite that believed the survival of the North Korean 
system was at stake.143  Under this scenario, the people most victimized would be the 
general population of North Korea.  Furthermore, a humanitarian catastrophe in North 
Korea, arising from the declining economic situation, has the potential to spark civil 
disorder and massive immigration into the neighboring countries and would raise major 
questions about who is in control of North Korea’s nuclear materials while all this is 
occurring.144   
Although the indicators for detecting an imminent major political or military 
crisis are limited due to the closed nature of the system, certain signals could be likely 
precursors to more ominous developments.  An increase in North Korean defectors to 
neighboring countries, sudden shifts in the leadership hierarchy, and oblique criticism of 
Kim Jong Il’s legitimacy and rule would signal a weakening of the political ties.  Socially 
and economically, a continued decline in grain harvests and increased requests for food 
and related humanitarian assistance, an increased crackdown on crimes, and an increased 
surveillance of hostile classes would signal the downward spiral of the regime and the 
attempt to maintain control over an increasingly dissatisfied state.  Military and security 
indicators include a growing militarization of the party through allotment of key party 
posts to senior military officers, unexpected or unusual military appointments, and 
withdrawal from four-party talks and negotiations regarding counter proliferation.145     
In May 2001, a DPRK official admitted that hundreds of thousands of North 
Koreans had died in the country’s famine.  The true mortality toll in this famine is 
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unknown, but the 2002 Worldwide Refugee Information country report on North Korea 
reported up to two million North Koreans, or nearly ten percent of the population, have 
died from hunger or famine-related disease since 1994; some mortality estimates range as 
high as 3.5 million.146  Recent census data suggest that an estimate of one million deaths 
from North Korea’s population of twenty-some million would not be unreasonable.147   
It is interesting to note that the shock of this catastrophic famine was not 
sufficient, in and of itself, to unsettle North Korea’s leadership, to destabilize the state, or 
to subvert the system, which brings out two points.  First, even though the famine 
entailed massive loss of life, the food scarcity was not so severe as to provoke a regime-
threatening internal political crisis.  Moreover, leaders in Pyongyang never found the 
food scarcity so pressing that they had to deny vital resources to the key pillars upon 
which the regime’s power rests, specifically the military, security systems and top 
echelons of the party.  Secondly, North Korea was able to prevent an economic collapse, 
mainly through skillful, assiduous and sometimes extortive aid-seeking diplomacy.148 
The assistance provided by the major powers has been and remains an essential 
factor in moderating the crisis in North Korea.  Over the past six years, North Korea 
secured millions of tons of multilateral food aid from the UN’s World Food program, 
supplies primarily financed by United States government donations.  North Korea has 
also elicited bilateral food transfers from the governments of Japan and the ROK.  
Moreover, North Korea’s aid diplomacy has enabled the regime to negotiate, free of 
charge, energy supplies from Western sponsors, most significantly the 500,000 tons a 
year of heavy fuel oil that the United States has pledged to provide under the Agreed 
Framework.149  The amount and type of assistance provided to the DPRK may prevent a 
collapse in the North, buying time for the possibility of peaceful reunification or at least 
influencing and possibly moderating the collapse.  Preventing a North Korean collapse 
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would be beneficial to South Korea, which would inherit the consequences of a 
destabilized situation.  In addition, economic assistance would benefit the North Korean 
populace, the true victims during the collapsing North Korean regime. It is therefore 
essential that the current North Korean economic crisis be closely watched by all states 
involved.     
In addition to Western, Japanese and South Korean sources of aid, the DPRK still 
relies heavily upon economic assistance from China.  It would appear, however, the 
Chinese leadership operates with a complex and opportunistic calculus when it comes to 
aid for North Korea.  On the one hand, to the extent that it can do so, Beijing seems 
willing to transfer the burden of aiding North Korea to other countries and to reduce its 
own allocations accordingly.  On the other hand, preventing a DPRK implosion or 
explosion and forestalling turmoil on China’s Korean border appears to be a motivator 
for providing aid to Pyongyang.  The Chinese leadership is reconciled to the DPRK’s 
economic decline, but not to its collapse.  China has implicitly assumed the role of donor 
of last resort for Pyongyang, to the extent that external resources can be sufficient to 
prevent a collapse in North Korea.150 
Not only does the PRC provide economic assistance to the DPRK through aid, it 
has also influenced the North Korean regime to pursue a quasi-Chinese style, 
economically driven foreign and domestic policies, potentially unleashing societal 
changes of the kind that have occurred within the DRPK.  It is for this reason the reported 
implementation of Chinese-style market reforms in North Korea is significant.  
Regardless of whether or not the DPRK treads on the same path as the PRC, 
implementation of market reforms will likely increase Beijing’s control over the 
Pyongyang.151 
North and South Korea, and the four Pacific powers all recognize that integration 
through the collapse of the North Korean regime would create a pace of unification 
detrimental to the Korean peninsula.  Therefore, to prevent the collapse of North Korea 
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from becoming a reality, it is essential that all parties involved monitor the economic 
situation of the DPRK to avoid a potentially costly reunification.       
 
C. INTEGRATION THROUGH CONFLICT  
In 1973, South Korean President Park Chung Hee stated that “we should guard 
against the theory that [unification] should be attained whatever the cost.  What meaning 
would unification have, if what we united was just a heap of debris.”152  Despite 
unpredictable events in the following three decades, this statement continues to mirror the 
attitude of South Korea and the Pacific powers.  The unification of Korea through 
conflict would occur if either regime, more than likely the North, decided to reunify the 
peninsula through military means or some other form of conflict, possibly destroying a 
majority of the peninsula.  While unification under this scenario would likely occur after 
a North Korean military attack on the South, some Americans and South Koreans 
advocate a joint use of pressure against the North to bring about unification.153  
Especially given the current “war on terrorism,” and the possibility of its extension into 
Iraq, unification through military means instigated by the United States and/or South 
Korea is highly unlikely.  The plausibility of the DPRK initiating a military conflict is 
derived from the continual investment by North Korea in major force modernization 
programs, despite evidence of systemic decline and even as the South endeavors to close 
the gap in various military capabilities.154  Furthermore, North Korean policies and 
practices account for most of the volatility within Northeast Asia since the end of the 
Cold War, augmented by the inability of foreign analysts to thoroughly understand or 
predict with great accuracy North Korean behavior. 
Despite North Korea facing increasingly problematic economic prospects, its 
primary military objectives appear to have changed little since the end of the Cold War.  
The DPRK continues to:  (1) maintain the military capabilities needed to achieve 
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strategic and operational surprise in wartime and to sustain strategic momentum so that 
break through operations can be successfully concluded before the arrival of major 
reinforcements; (2) prepare to utilize massive firepower against the Combined Forces 
Command (CFC) through its artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-surface 
missiles; (3) seek to isolate Seoul and capture all air and naval facilities capable of 
supporting United States reinforcements and resupply efforts; (4) aim to neutralize ROK 
and United States air power; and (5) seek to foster widespread internal confusion and 
panic in the South Korean population.  All of these are meant to create domestic pressure 
in the ROK for a settlement on terms advantageous to the DPRK.155  A robust military 
arsenal allows North Korea to diminish its sense of strategic vulnerability stemming from 
the disparity between the North’s dwindling economic assets and the South’s economic 
capabilities and from the inability to substantially weaken the United States – ROK 
alliance.156 
It is difficult to speculate about Pyongyang’s motivation, since North Korea has 
employed a policy of strategic deception since its creation.  For example, the preparations 
for North Korea’s surprise attack against South Korea in June 1950 remained secret 
because Pyongyang used diplomacy to help keep its target off guard, offering Seoul a 
new peace and unification initiative just a week before it launched its assault.  North 
Korea’s practice of strategic deception again occurred in early 1992, when the DPRK 
submitted falsified data to the IAEA about the status of its nuclear program after the 
initiation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  
North Korea’s reputation for unpredictability and its ability to continuously utilize it is 
testimony to the success of this official government policy.157  
On the positive side, the danger on the Korean peninsula continues to recede, 
since the balance of powers on the peninsula has shifted toward South Korea and against 
the North.  With more than twice the population, Seoul’s economy is now at least 25 
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times as large as Pyongyang’s.158  Furthermore, while devoting a declining percentage of 
its GDP to defense, South Korea is able to finance larger annual increases in its defense 
budget than the North can muster.  Thus, the North is in no condition to initiate conflict 
and the South has no interest in doing so.  Additionally, regardless of the differing 
interests possessed by the Pacific powers, all share an interest in avoiding a renewal of 
conflict or proliferation of nuclear weapons on the peninsula.159  On a less positive side, 
the concerns about North Korea’s nuclear proliferation persist, which prompted President 
Bush to include the DPRK in his “axis of evil” during the 2002 State of the Union 
address.  While the 1994 nuclear framework agreement managed to freeze North Korea’s 
nuclear activities, Pyongyang may have hidden away a small cache of weapons or 
weapon-grade material.  Additionally, North Korea’s links to terrorism remain a 
concern.160            
Conjectures about North Korean use of force arrive from two principal 
circumstances.  First, Kim Jong Il could make an irrevocable decision to employ his 
military assets before they degrade further to exploit South Korea’s internal 
preoccupations and to gain major political advantage for the North.  Secondly, domestic 
instability in the North could precipitate political and military disintegration, which in 
turn could result in unauthorized applications of force or limited military probes by 
contending factions within the Korean People’s Army (KPA).161  Reports of corruption 
among North Korean border guards and officials are a sign that the regime may be losing 
its grip, despite its efforts to maintain the current totalitarian infrastructure.162   
Rather than initiating an overt military attack or invasion on South Korea, the 
DPRK could engage in limited forms of military acts or continue to engage in overt 
terrorist acts, as seen throughout history.  For example, in October 1983, a North Korean 
assassination attempt on the South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon, 
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Burma missed the president but killed 17 members of his cabinet.   Additionally, a South 
Korean passenger jet was downed on 29 November 1987, after Kim Jong Il allegedly 
ordered North Korean agents to put a bomb on a South Korean airliner.  All 115 people 
on board the Korean Airlines plane died.163  The willingness of Pyongyang to 
continuously engage in terrorist acts is the reason the United States included it on the 
state-sponsored terrorism list.   
Another possibility is for North Korea to embark on a series of incursions, 
including renewed efforts to undermine the Armistice Agreement and ad hoc missions 
similar to the submarine infiltration incidents of September 1996 and June 1998.  The 
first submarine infiltration occurred on 18 Sep 1996, after a North Korean submarine 
infiltrated South Korean territory, coming aground along the coast of the East Sea.  
Among the 26 North Korean infiltrators 11 of them were allegedly executed by the AK 
rifle of their colleagues. Strangely, none of the victims carried an AK rifle.164  A similar 
incident occurred in in June 1998, when a North Korean submarine was captured not far 
from the previous submarine infiltraiton.165 
Similarly, a change of the discord within the status quo relationship between the 
DPRK, and/or the ROK and the United States may adversely affect the standing of the 
DPRK military, economically, politically and socially.  If the military felt threatened 
enough by the potential of elimination arising from the reconciliation of the two Koreas, 
it would be beneficial to maintain the tension.  The recent Naval clash between the DPRK 
and ROK may be an example of the North Korean regime preparing for a future overt 
military clash against South Korea.166   
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A North Korean option aside from resorting to a full-scale war, or engaging in 
limited military or terrorist attacks include destabilization campaigns within South Korea, 
against the ROK and/or the United States.  Within South Korea, the DPRK could provide 
support for radical student movements through discreet financial support, or attempt to 
influence public attitudes on unification, security, or the American presence on the 
peninsula.  Under this scenario, the DPRK would attempt to trigger a massive collapse of 
the morale in South Korea and a decrease of support in the United States.  In early 1983, 
North Korea launched an ultra-nationalistic, anti-American propaganda offensive 
designed to create social and political unrest.  This campaign was designed to create 
social and political unrest in the South.  Moreover, it capitalized on the increasingly anti-
American sentiment in South Korea, in the wake of the 1980 civil uprising in Kwangju, 
suppressed in a bloody crackdown by U.S.-backed South Korea troops.  Pyongyang 
sought to incite South Korean students and dissidents to anti-American actions, blaming 
the United States for the continuing territorial division and the resulting “agony and 
misery of the Korean people.”167  Through clandestine publications, North Korea urged 
South Koreans of all walks to rise up in “anti-American, pro-independence” struggles.  
Subsequently, in August 1985, Pyongyang inaugurated an anti-American/ anti-ROK 
underground organization called the “South Korean National Democratic Front to be 
used as an instrument of propaganda, agitation, and disinformation against United 
States/ROK interests.168   
Currently, it would not be difficult for the DPRK to inflame anti-American 
protests, which increased following the 13 June 2002 accidental deaths of two 13-year 
old South Korean girls hit by a U.S. Army convoy passing through their village.169  
Although the United States Ambassador Thomas C. Hubbard apologized for the death of 
the girls, many South Koreans felt it was not enough.170  Additionally, Washington’s 
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apologies have received little reporting in the South Korean press, which has prompted 
the United States command to issue a complaint over “inaccurate reports that have 
created false impressions in the [South] Korean public.”171   
The political and economic indicators within the DPRK include an increase of 
hard-line senior military officers, accusations alleging ROK offensive actions directed 
against the North, and a primary emphasis on maintaining a war-sustaining economy.  
Furthermore, the North Korean regime could engage in exhortations by the top leadership 
to overcome economic difficulties through even greater ideological indoctrination, and a 
propagation of war preparations to maximize mobilization efforts.  Socially, the DPRK 
could increase the control over internal population movements, and enhance surveillance 
of the citizens.  The military indicators would include an abrogation of the Agreed 
Framework, and acceleration of training regimes for key military units, and an increase in 
North Korean activities near the Joint Security Area (JSA) and around missile sites.172  
Although there is no indication of a likely North Korean attack on South Korea or any 
other type of military conflict, many of the indicators within the DPRK have been 
occurring throughout the last half-century.      
The current war on terrorism occurring in Afghanistan and the rising potential of 
an attack on Iraq as of this writing could act as a catalyst for the North Korean military to 
attack the South.  The United States for many years has been concerned about 
Pyongyang's support for international terrorism, thus including North Korea on its list of 
terrorism-sponsoring nations, with Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Syria.  It has been 
one of the major aims of North Korean diplomacy vis-à-vis the United States, to get off 
this incriminating list; therefore special attention was paid as to how Pyongyang reacted 
to the 2001 terrorist attacks against America. On more than one occasion, the North 
Koreans declared they reject "all forms of terrorism and any support of it". On the other 
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hand, the communist regime condemned in clear terms the United States’ military attacks 
against Afghanistan, warning that the "vicious circle of terrorism and retaliation may 
plunge the world into the holocaust of war.” 173 
If an overt military plan of attack were to occur, the DPRK would likely be acting 
independently of any support from the PRC and Russia.  In fact, North Korea would most 
likely go to extreme measures to ensure operational security or non-disclosure of any 
planned military operations because both countries could seek to preempt an impending 
crisis on the Korean peninsula by high-level political pressure on Pyongyang and may 
engage in simultaneous consultations with the ROK and/or United States, informing them 
of the North Korean’s actions.  Ultimately, the execution of North Korean war plans 
under this scenario would entail extraordinary risks, with little possibility it would result 
in the end of the North Korean regime and unification of the peninsula with terms 
favorable to the ROK.174 
The devastation of the Korean peninsula following the Korean War eliminates the 
desire for the ROK or any of the Pacific powers to unify Korea through military force.  In 
addition, the danger of war on the peninsula continues to recede following the power shift 
toward South Korea.  However, the only hope North Korea currently possesses to unify 
Korea under its control is through military conquest.  Furthermore, the DPRK’s possible 
acquisition of nuclear weapons and potential power struggles within North Korea forces 
one to consider the possibility of integration of both Koreas through conflict in order to 
prevent its initiation.       
 
D. DISEQUILIBRIUM AND EXTERNAL INTERVENTION 
The fourth scenario examines an environment characterized by sustained 
disequilibrium but not necessarily chaos or conflict.  Arguably, the most serious crisis on 
the Korean peninsula has been the possibility of an unexpected, internal crisis in North 
Korea that the current leadership does not have the capacity to manage.  Such a crisis 
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could arise from the continued decline in North Korea’s economic and energy 
capabilities, combined with a loss of cohesion, disintegration, or inability by the top 
leadership to impose central political control.  Continuing under this circumstance, North 
Korean leadership may initiate a desperate and destructive policy response, it may lead to 
the possibility of economic collapse, or it may result in a transition in political power 
from the current regime to a new leadership.175  However, another option would entail 
external intervention to avoid a collapsing or destructive North Korean state.  The two 
predominant permutations under this scenario include:  (1) a “hollowed out” North 
Korea, which would be a minimally functioning state for all practical purposes, on the 
edge of collapse or (2) a weakened North Korean state requesting and obtaining support 
from an external state, likely the PRC or United States, in order to forestall outright 
collapse.  This is not to predict, however, that any of the Pacific powers are anticipating 
such an intervention.176 
The most likely external intervening power under this scenario would be China 
due to the enduring ties between the PRC and DPRK.  The Chinese may intervene in the 
event that North Korea, despite a clear aversion to dependence on China, signals a 
readiness to “tilt” toward China in exchange for enhanced economic and political 
support.  Also, China may consider an intervention if the indicators of instability in the 
North and its possible repercussions for stability and security in contiguous border areas 
of China convince Beijing that it must act to protect its own interests.  It would be 
problematic for the PRC if the ROK and United States were to embark on a unilateral 
course of action to counter the instability in the DPRK, especially if Beijing believed it 
would undermine China’s long-term political and security interests.177 
North Korea tottering on the brink of collapse poses a major policy dilemma for 
the PRC.  If the Chinese leadership decided that the dissolution of the DPRK through 
collapse was inevitable, and that -- despite the historical affinities -- it was not in China’s 
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interest to prolong the state’s existence, Beijing would most likely seek to contain the 
risks within the North Korean territory and ensure its strategic and economic interests in a 
unified Korea under the auspices of the ROK.  Furthermore, China may attempt to 
dissuade the ROK and the United States from direct involvement in the North.178  
Alternatively, the PRC may significantly accelerate its cooperation and communication 
with the United States and ROK, enabling all three states to manage an endgame crisis in 
the North, while simultaneously reducing the risk of misperception or an overt clash of 
interests among them.  Regardless, the PRC would have to prepare for the influx of 
refugees into China, the political and economic consequences of a unified Korea led by 
the ROK, the possibility of the United States maintaining troops in Korea following 
unification, and the ramifications of a strong American-Japanese security relationship in 
addition to a robust U.S.-ROK alliance.179                    
Although an overt and massive Chinese intervention in North Korea akin to the 
Korean War is highly unlikely, the possibility of certain forms of intervention cannot be 
excluded given the past role of North Korea as a buffer zone for China and the 
socioeconomic implications of a highly unstable North Korea.  China would likely want 
its actions to be purposeful and decisive because a protracted, inconclusive situation does 
not serve Chinese interests.  Beijing has no incentive to take on an open-ended 
commitment.  If North Korea were to rely on the PRC for support for an extended period, 
China may decide that a collapse, followed by absorption by the ROK, is a preferable 
alternative.180   
Additionally, if the PRC intervened with the assistance of the United States and/or 
Japan, China may either seek to ensure that any American forces deployed in Korea after 
unification would remain below the 38th parallel and that major U.S. strategic assets were 
not maintained on the peninsula; or China could seek to coax South Korea into signing a 
friendship treaty in return for China’s tacit support for unification under ROK auspices, 
while seeking to limit the scope of future ROK-United States security collaboration.181  
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The important consideration is that China has both the capabilities and political-security 
equities to shape the ultimate outcome, and has few incentives to remain passive during 
the unification process.182 
The United States is another potential source of external intervention in the event 
of a drastically weakened North Korean state, possibly with the assistance of Japan.  Due 
to the presence of American troops in the ROK, and the United States commitment under 
the Mutual Defense Treaty, conflict or instability on the peninsula would automatically 
involve U.S. troops, and would therefore require the attention of American policy makers 
at the highest level.183  Unfortunately, anything less than overt conflict on the Korean 
peninsula does not appear to be a top priority for policy-makers.  Not only do the United 
States and South Korea have differing priorities placed on maintaining stability versus 
facilitating a peaceful unification, there are debates within the United States on 
supporting a “soft-landing” for North Korea versus the belief that Washington should not 
attempt to save North Korean leaders from collapsing under the weight of its own failed 
policies.184  Increasingly, many in Washington are adopting the view that enhanced 
deterrence is the answer to the North Korea dilemma, and the United States should cease 
propping up Pyongyang and let its inevitable collapse come sooner rather than later.185                
Absent a crisis in North Korea, Americans attention to Korean issues is usually 
sporadic and inconsistent.  In many ways, the DPRK “state of crisis situation” has almost 
become normalcy for the United States, numbing American policymakers not only to the 
possibility that instability could potentially lead to conflict, but also raising questions 
about whether one exists at all – at least one that would require United States 
intervention.  Similarly, North Korean tactics of brinkmanship and its zero-sum approach 
has created a “boy who cried wolf,” syndrome.  Since there have been so many false 
alarms on the Korean peninsula, United States policymakers have either become immune 
to calls for crisis or have failed to discern between a real crisis and tactical attempts to 
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create an atmosphere of crisis.186  Unfortunately, the current war on terrorism and 
potential military intervention in Iraq will only amplify this phenomenon.  This is not to 
discount American involvement in Korean unification, however, the PRC would likely 
play a larger role under this scenario.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
The “how” of Korean unification, not the “if” or “when” represents the most 
pressing and immediate challenge to policy-makers and analysts because the ultimate 
outcome will determine whether a unified Korea is able to move forward in a coherent 
way to shape its regional strategies and policies.  In addition, unification raises several 
strategic issues, such as the orientation and policies of the new government, the 
composition of a post-unification military establishment, the economic priorities and 
policies it would undertake, and the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance.187 
The internal problems Korea will face following unification will vary depending 
upon the unification path pursued, and will affect all Pacific powers.  If unification occurs 
through any means other than peaceful integration, a period of instability and possibly 
violence would occur.  This is a concern to the United States given the large number 
military forces and civilians present in South Korea, and mindful of the weapons of mass 
destruction.  Additionally, it would be more difficult for the United States to negotiate 
with a weakened Korean state on the nature of post-unification foreign policy options.  A 
vulnerable and unstable Korea government would be more easily swayed by powerful 
neighbors, and might find it difficult to create a coherent foreign policy, especially one 
favorable to the United States.        
Therefore, the central challenge of any future unification scenario on the Korean 
peninsula is the disparity between the ultimate objective and the means to achieve it.  
From the South Korean perspective, the desired outcome is the ultimate creation of a 
unified, democratic, and internationalist Korea.  To the degree that United States has been 
intimately linked with the ROK since its creation, it appears to share this overriding 
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objective.  However, as recent events unfold on the peninsula, especially since the 
initiation of the United States-led war on terrorism, it remains to be seen whether the 
ROK and United States will achieve full agreement on this fundamental goal.  It is 
unlikely the United States has a hidden agenda for the Korean peninsula, however, the 
respective roles of Washington and Seoul in the unification process remains to be 
determined.  Additional factors, such as the contribution of neighboring Japan, China and 
even Russia, provide for major and lasting consequences on the Korean peninsula.188  
Therefore, the path Korea embarks upon during the reunification of the peninsula will 
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IV. UNIFIED KOREAN FOREIGN POLICY OPTIONS  
A post-unified Korea faces the choice between policies of alignment and 
nonalignment with the Pacific powers.  Many believe a continuation of an alignment with 
the United States would be the most advantageous and viable option for the new Korean 
state.  Likewise, many argue following the reunification of Korea, Northeast Asia will 
remain a region of ample and growing United States economic, political, and security 
interest.  While Korea has many incentives to maintain close relations with the United 
States following unification, major uncertainties exist that will likely influence its foreign 
policy options.  As such, a continuation of the U.S.-Korean security alliance cannot be 
assumed.   
While the North Korean threat continues to plague the political and security 
considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no viable replacement for the United States-
ROK security alliance.  The American forces stationed in Korea reduce both the 
likelihood of war and the costs of defending the Republic.189  However, it is apparent the 
ROK government has started to readjust its security role to lessen its independence on the 
United States and increase its multilateral ties.  Because of the recent United States-led 
“war on terrorism” and the possibility of a military involvement in Iraq, the foreign 
policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington at this time.  
Moreover, since the categorization of North Korea as part of an “axis of evil,” tension 
between the United States and North Korea has worsened and increased the strain in the 
U.S.-ROK relationship.  South Korean leaders are divided between those who agree with 
and others who object to President Bush’s remarks.  Such divisiveness undermines peace 
and stability on the Korean peninsula and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK 
alliance.190   
After the elimination of the North Korean threat to the peninsula, a unified Korea 
will be able to redefine its foreign policy options.  Consequently, Koreans may take 
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advantage of the end of the North Korean threat to remove American military forces from 
Korea and achieve equidistance from the various powers in Asia.191  Alternatively, Korea 
may look to another Asian power, such as Japan or the PRC, to provide security and 
stability within the peninsula following unification.  A unified Korea closely aligned with 
and under the protection of either China or Japan is sure to make the other regional 
powers uneasy.  For this reason, President Kim Dae Jung currently attaches a high 
priority to simultaneous close relations with the four major powers and the continuation 
of a strong alliance relationship with the United States.192     
China’s rapid economic advancement, its prospective emergence as a more fully 
developed major power, and its search for regional stability will absolutely factor into 
Korean foreign policy options.  On one hand, the history of Chinese relations with its 
neighboring states may undermine the post-unification Sino-Korean relationship.  Due to 
the previous tributary relationship between the two states, it is hard to believe the Chinese 
will interact in an equal partnership fashion that unified-Korea will no doubt demand.193  
On the other hand, following unification Korea may become a strong enough regional 
power to avoid regressing in its relations with China.  As such, it would be detrimental 
for China to attempt to control Korea, which would no doubt generate an anti-Chinese 
reaction.194     
According to Kenneth Waltz in “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power,” the 
expected outcome of state interaction within the international system is the formation of a 
balance of power.195  Furthermore, states are unitary actors which, at a minimum, seek 
their own preservation and at a maximum, drive for universal domination.196  A potential 
balance of power shift in any direction within Northeast Asia following unification 
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concerns all of the Pacific powers, as well as both Koreas.  Thus, the strategic 
calculations of a unified Korea and all the Pacific powers vary concerning the post-
unification dynamics of the Korean peninsula and its subsequent regional implications.   
Each of the Pacific powers regards the Korean peninsula as falling within its own 
strategic sphere.  Moreover, Koreans have long recognized their own geographic and 
security predicament.  Thus, the Korean peninsula is still seen by many as the most 
important security nexus within Northeast Asia.  This is significant because the world’s 
heaviest concentration of military and economic capabilities currently reside in Northeast 
Asia.197  In addition, the contribution and influence of each country on the reconciliation 
process varies.  Each state will differ in its interaction with the unified Korean state in the 
context of their historical legacies with the peninsula, as well as its prospective 
involvement in a unified Korea’s future development.  However, all countries involved 
do share one similarity:  none has an incentive to see disorder or instability, either during 
the transition process or in the aftermath of unification.198  Within this context one can 
begin an examination of unified Korea’s foreign policy alternatives, and the subsequent 
regional implications.  
 
A. ONE KOREA 
The possibility exists following the unification of Korea that Korean nationalism 
might reassert itself against the United States, Japan, Russia and the PRC.  In this 
context, the Koreans may choose to dissolve the security alliance with the United States 
after the removal of the North Korean threat of war and operate as an independent 
regional power.  It would be beneficial for Korea to achieve independence from the 
United States and all of the regional powers to avoid being forced into choosing sides and 
tilting the regional balance of power toward one side or another.   Furthermore, Korea 
may seek distance from the United States to avoid being drawn into America’s perceived 
anti-Chinese policies.  This does not mean that Korea would follow an anti-American 
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policy, only that it would seek to avoid the occasionally suffocating embrace of the 
United States.199  Obviously, if Korea decides to sever its alliance with the United States, 
Washington will have to accept this decision.200      
Koreans possess a strong sense of nationalism and an understandable feeling that 
they have been subjected to unjust treatment for most of the twentieth century.  
Unfortunately, Korea after unification will still be a small country surrounded by two 
continent-sized nuclear powers, China and Russia, and an economic superpower, Japan.  
Therefore, maintaining a strategic balance of power within Northeast Asia will be a 
foremost goal of unified Korea.  In addition to balance of power considerations, 
reunification will be a national victory for Korea, and Koreans may not want foreign 
troops to remain for long in their homeland.201    
Koreans have several reasons to be ambivalent about America and preserving the 
current security alliance following reunification.  During the last century, despite the 
American perception that Koreans completely support the United State’s role on the 
peninsula, Washington’s inconsistent policy toward the Korean peninsula frequently 
diminished the support of the Korean people.  Following the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese 
War, Washington acquiesced to Japan’s dominance of Korea in exchange for the 
Japanese consent to the American occupation of the Philippines.  In 1945, following the 
end of World War II, American bureaucrats cut the Korean peninsula in half without any 
Korean consultation, and made no great effort to apprehend Japanese guilty of war crimes 
against Koreans.202  Additionally, in 1953, the United States unilaterally signed an 
armistice that prolonged the division of Korea, despite the opposition of President 
Syngman Rhee.  The effects of these perceived American betrayals, combined with the 
current anti-American sentiment, decrease the likelihood of a Korean desire to maintain a 
U.S. military presence following reunification.   
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Moreover, since Korea was freed from Japan in 1945, the ROK’s military 
dependence on the United States has limited its sovereignty.  Currently, a United States 
Army general sits at the top of the military chain of operational command of the South 
Korean armed forces in wartime.  Additionally, the large compound occupied by the 
United States military in the center of downtown Seoul is a symbol of America’s weight 
in Korean affairs.  The fact that the United States defends the ROK does not mitigate the 
psychological scars caused by America’s role in Korea throughout the past century.203   
Whatever the benefits the ROK retains from a United States military presence on 
the peninsula, the forward deployed troops also brings a high cost to the South Korean 
hosts.  As illustrated by the June 2002 protests over the two teenage girls killed by a 
United States military vehicle, the American presence has inadvertently damaged the 
property of and caused bodily injury to South Korean civilians.  Likewise, when the 
behavior of young American soldiers in South Korea is less than exemplary and a South 
Korean law is broken, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under which American 
troops serve in the ROK protects them from local prosecution if the alleged crimes carry 
a sentence of less than three years in prison.204  This type of provision undoubtedly 
strikes many South Koreans as coming close to the old colonial extraterritoriality.205  
Following the reunification of Korea, would the free people of a stronger peninsula be 
willing to continue to pay this price? 
Obviously, Pyongyang also has its own reasons for the withdrawal of the U.S. 
military presence on the peninsula.  In the wake of the June 2000 summit, the DPRK has 
a plausible argument against the American military troops stationed in South Korea if the 
two Koreas are moving toward reconciliation, undoubtedly a point also shared by many 
South Koreans.  In May 2001, Nodong Sinmun, the official North Korean party 
newspaper wrote:   
In the past, the United States said that the U.S. forces should be stationed 
in South Korea to deter our southward invasion…The North and South 
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have adopted an agreement on no aggression in the 15 June Joint 
Declaration.  It is our steadfast stand to implement them to improve the 
inter-Korean relations and stabilize the situation on the Korean 
peninsula.206        
A few weeks later, the official North Korean news agency KCNA expounded on the 
point: 
The United States is left with no justification to claim any longer that the 
U.S. forces should stay in South Korea to “deter southward advance” of 
the Soviet Union and repel the “invasion of the South” by the North.  The 
Soviet Union does not exist any more and the North and South of Korea 
adopted the historic June 15 Joint Declaration in which they stated their 
will to achieve the independence and peaceful unification of the country 
based on the basis of reconciliation and unity.207     
Unfortunately, the exhilaration following the June 2000 summit meeting between 
North and South Korean leaders was soon overshadowed by North Korea’s violations of 
the 1994 agreement.  Soon thereafter, North Korea decided to boycott the scheduled fifth 
round of ministerial talks with South Korea following the return of Kim Dae Jung from 
his visit to the United States.  Since then, the relations between the United States and 
DPRK have not improved, and Pyongyang appeared to have strengthened its negotiation 
hand by consolidating relations with Russia and China.208  Furthermore, North Korea 
continues to improve its relations with Western countries aside from the United States, as 
illustrated by the high-level delegation of the European Union (EU) by Goeran Persson, 
president of the European Council and prime minister of Sweden, a first time visit to 
Pyongyang by an EU President.209  During the same period, North Korea deliberately 
froze inter-Korean relations and blamed the United States for the deadlock.         
A unified Korean state acting as its own regional power would dramatically 
change the dynamics within Northeast Asia.  A disintegration of the U.S. security alliance 
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with South Korea following reunification may create a security vacuum in the area and 
recreate a modern day version of realpolitik, a recurring theme throughout Korean 
history.  As such, some Korean politicians may argue that a reunified Korea choosing to 
maintain distance from all the Pacific powers in pursuit of its own regional strength 
should keep the North’s missile and nuclear programs.  Not to do so would leave Korea 
unilaterally disarmed against China, Russia, and Japan.210  A 1999 survey conducted by 
RAND revealed that forty-six percent strongly agree and forty percent somewhat agree 
that if the United States-South Korean alliance is ended, South Korea should acquire 
nuclear weapons.  In addition, a majority of fifty-five percent strongly agree and thirty-
two percent somewhat agree that South Korea should develop nuclear weapons if Japan 
does.211  Korean nuclearization, even if limited to discussion, would frighten Japan 
because it lacks a nuclear deterrent.212  Moreover, the Chinese would be affected because 
a unified Korea possessing nuclear weapons could prove a less cooperative neighbor than 
the two halves of a divided Korea that are focused on and compete for Chinese favor.213      
Without strong and continuing American support throughout the reunification 
process, it is possible the United States-Korean military alliance may decay or dissolve 
altogether following unification.  The end to this alliance has the potential to set further 
strategic changes in motion throughout the region.  Such potential change is the 
withdrawal of the United States military from South Korea, which would leave Japan as 
the single East Asian country basing American forces on its soil.214  Furthermore, such 
an arrangement may not be acceptable to the Japanese electorate, which may also demand 
the withdrawal of U.S. troops.  Washington’s somewhat maladroit initiatives intended to 
stimulate inter-Korean rapprochement could actually trigger a series of unexpected and 
uncontrollable events, in which the United States would for the first time in over a half-
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century have no forward military presence in an East Asia region potentially containing 
several nuclear states.215  In addition, an American military pullout from South Korea, 
not to mention all of East Asia, would naturally decrease the amount of U.S. influence on 
the region, creating a more unstable region.216       
 
B. JAPAN 
Following Korean unification, Japan will no longer face a weak and divided 
peninsula.  Achieving a more amicable long-term Japanese-Korean relationship will 
depend on efforts by both countries, each of which may hope to maintain a close 
relationship with the United States.217  Furthermore, Korean unification will also have a 
major impact on American-Japanese relations.  As long as the North Korean threat 
remains, the United States is unlikely to alter its military deployment in Japan.  However, 
once the threat is removed, the need for U.S. protection will be less obvious.218       
Japan has an immense stake in the outcome of unification because it will 
determine the fundamental nature of the strategic relationship with the post-unified 
Korea.  A unified Korea that retains nuclear weapons, tilts toward China, refuses to 
continue its security relationship with the United States and the American military 
presence, or is hostile toward Japan in its vision of the future would create a problem of 
great concern for the stability of the Japanese future.219  Additionally, Japan’s 
commercial interests are also affected by the outcome of the reunification process 
because Japan and the ROK have developed close economic ties since the end of World 
War II.  The interdependence of the two countries’ economies became evident following 
the 1997 financial crisis in South Korea, after Japan contributed billions of dollars to help 
rescue the ROK economy.  Moreover, Japan has become South Korea’s second leading 
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trade partner, even though the two countries compete in steel, consumer electronics and 
shipbuilding.  However, it is also important to note that Japan’s own economic troubles 
have also caused troubles for the South Korean economy.  The stagnation of the Japanese 
economy has dried up major Korean export markets, and Japan’s banks had to withdraw 
credit facilities from neighboring countries, including the ROK.220 
Moreover, Korean reunification will influence the future structure of international 
relations within Northeast Asia, which will bear heavily with other powers whose 
interests intersect on the Korean peninsula, including Japan.  Currently, Japan’s greatest 
concern is the future relationship with the United States and the shape of the U.S.-
Japanese alliance.  A post-unification U.S.-Korean alliance and a continued American 
presence on the Korean peninsula would reassure Japan that a unified Korea would be 
disposed to improve its ties with Japan.221  Retention of United States military forces in a 
reunified Korea will also affect the military presence in Japan.   
In addition, the course that unification takes will also affect Japan’s relationship 
with Russia and China.  A unified Korea that tilted toward China or even stood 
equidistant between China and Japan would complicate the Japanese future strategic 
position.222  While Japan wants to balance the growing influence that China has acquired 
on the peninsula, it is also not eager to engage in a confrontation with the Chinese over 
Korea.  Japan has sought to separate economics from politics in its relationship with the 
PRC, and it has been able to do so due to the triangular relationship with the United 
States.223  With regard to Russia, Japan has been actively pursuing a stronger connection 
as a way of diversifying diplomatic options and cultivating the potential common 
interests the two countries may have in balancing Chinese influence on the Korean 
peninsula, with the hope of affecting the foreign policy of a reunified Korea. 
Currently, Japanese-ROK relations have improved under the Kim Dae Jung 
administration, as exemplified by the joint statement released in October 1998 during 
President Kim’s visit to Tokyo.  The joint declaration of the two nations' new partnership, 
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signed on 8 October 1998 after the ROK-Japan summit, was an attempt to resolve the 
issue of past history recognition, in order to create a future foundation for joint efforts 
toward peace and prosperity.  In the declaration Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo 
"expressed deep remorse and extended a heartfelt apology to the people of South Korea, 
having humbly accepted the historical fact that Japan inflicted heavy damage and pain on 
the people of South Korea through its colonial rule."224   
Likewise, the possible normalization of Japanese-North Korean relations were 
recently exemplified following the 17 September 2002 meeting between Japanese Prime 
Minister Koizumi Junichiro and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang.  During 
the visit, Kim Jong Il admitted that the DPRK had kidnapped 12 Japanese, allowing for a 
historic agreement between the two countries.  North Korea agreed to freeze missile 
launches indefinitely, and Japan promised to move toward diplomatic recognition of the 
country and a hefty aid program of compensation for Japan's wartime occupation.  More 
importantly, talks scheduled to start in October 2002 will hopefully lead to full 
normalization of ties between Japan and North Korea and put an end to more than a half-
century of bristling hostility.225  
While the recent overtures by Japan to improve bilateral relationship with both 
North and South Korea has been significant, the Japanese relationship still carries the 
heavy baggage of mistrust that will not evaporate in just a few years.  Both Koreas 
remain bitter over the suffering during the Japanese occupation period.  Thus, while 
Japan has critical issues at stake in the foreign policy of a reunified Korea, it 
unfortunately labors under several constraints that lessen the likelihood it would take the 
lead in resolving the complexity on the Korean peninsula.226   
In addition, the memory of recent tensions between Japan and the DPRK 
undoubtedly remain.  On 24 March 1999, Tokyo alleged that two North Korean spy ships 
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off the coast of Japan fired upon Japanese planes and ships.227  The relationship between 
the communist pariah state and the economic giant further eroded following the sinking 
of a North Korea spy ship in Japanese waters on 22 December 2001.  The ROK 
government supported Japan’s actions in this incident, but the public reaction in South 
Korea to this development was of concern about Japanese militarism.228  The fear of a 
reversion back to Japanese militarism also increased following Japan’s participation in 
the U.S.-led war on terrorism.  Opponents within Japan and the Asian region, many of 
whom suffered the brunt of Japanese militarism during World War II, feared it could be a 
first step toward loosening constitutional constraints on Japan's armed forces.229  As 
such, while the recent overtures between Japan and North Korea are significant, there still 
exists a great deal of baggage that both countries must overcome before normalization 
can occur.   
As a result and despite the importance of Korean unification on Japan’s future, 
Tokyo is unlikely to play a proactive or assertive role on Korean issues.  Rather, it is 
more likely that Japan would be reactive and adaptive in the unification process, 
accommodating to the changing circumstances of unification in a cautious and 
incremental fashion.  Nevertheless, Japan cannot afford to resist unification.  Neither can 
the Korean peninsula dispense with the resources that Japan can bring to bear.230  Given 
Japan’s extensive political and economic linkages with the ROK and its strategic 
interdependence with South Korea in the context of their respective bilateral security ties 
with the United States, the prospect for complementary relations through a unified Korea 
seems promising.231  There seems to be an incentive for both leaderships to pursue in 
earnest an increasing and ongoing consultative relationship.232  Moreover, Japan will 
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most likely play a substantial economic and financial role in the rebuilding of the 
north.233  Therefore, the role of Japan will go a long way toward determining an enduring 
settlement on the peninsula and achieving a stable new order in Northeast Asia.234   
 
C. UNITED STATES 
Following Korean unification, Washington will face several choices regarding its 
role in Asia.  The key issue likely being in the military sphere.  Similarly, the desires of a 
post-unified Korean state will decide whether the American presence will remain in 
Korea.  As such, the role of the United States during and after Korean reunification will 
greatly influence the dynamics of Northeast Asian stability.235  The obvious desire of the 
United States would be to maintain a clear focus on East Asian security, allowing 
Washington and the unified Korean state to retain their relationship, subject to periodic 
adjustment.  A shortcoming of this scenario would be the desire of the Korean state to 
retain American forces on the peninsula after the elimination of the North Korean threat.  
Furthermore, many Americans believe the United States “hegemony” should be replaced 
in Northeast Asia by a traditional balance of power among China, Japan, Russia, Korea, 
Taiwan, and the United States.  Under this scenario, the United States should rely on 
multilateral institutions to transfer some of the burden onto the shoulders of others.236  
Either way, it is important to consider the implications for Korea’s neighboring states, 
such as the PRC, Japan, and Russia.   
John Mearsheimer, in The Great Tragedy of Power Politics, argues against the 
claim that “security competition and war between the great powers has been purged from 
the international system,” especially since the end of the Cold War.  He asserts that the 
United States maintains military troops in both Europe and Northeast Asia because it 
recognizes the dangerous rivalries that would likely emerge among the major powers in 
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these regions following a withdrawal of American troops.237  Under this rationale, the 
United States should keep forces in both Japan and Korea to prevent Japanese-Korean 
tensions, in a sense “protecting” them from one another.  The United States can also act 
as a catalyst to foster Japanese-Korean military cooperation and thus improve relations 
between the two allies.238  Additionally, if China becomes an economic powerhouse, the 
possibility exists for the Chinese to translate its economic prosperity into military might 
and attempt to dominate Northeast Asia.239  A newly reunified Korean state would most 
likely not possess the ability to resist the PRC under this scenario.  Inevitably, this would 
create tension in Northeast Asia, resulting in an intense security competition.       
Currently, there are several debates in Washington concerning the continuation of 
a United States military presence in Korea following the elimination of the North Korean 
threat.  On one hand, many argue that a continuation of the United States military is 
essential to post-unified Korea.  Since the end of the Korean War, the U.S. security 
policy toward Korea has been instrumental in promoting peace and stability on the 
peninsula.  The strong defense alliance relationship between the United States and South 
Korea contributed immeasurably to regional stability and has the potential to continue to 
do so following reunification.  Common ideals, values, and objectives between the 
United States and a reunified Korean state can provide the basis for a continued robust 
security relationship, one that will prevent a resumption of historic strategic rivalries and 
thus ensure peace and stability on the peninsula.240  Furthermore, the U.S. presence will 
demonstrate to Koreans and foreigners that the United States stands by and supports the 
newly unified Korean states.241   
Similarly, a continuance of a strong American military presence can convince 
Koreans that, in exchange for a continued credible American commitment, the Korean 
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state need not develop long-range missiles and nuclear warheads.  A nuclear-armed 
Korea would not be a threat to the United States under this scenario, but it would open 
the door for a competitive arms race in the region that would destroy Japanese-Korean 
and Sino-Korean relations.242  Ideally, maintenance of the U.S.-Korean security 
relationship will enhance prospects for simultaneous good relations between a reunited 
Korea and all its giant neighbors.  In today’s geopolitical setting, the U.S. role as a 
regional stabilizer and balancer within Northeast Asia contributes to Korean security, and 
allows Seoul to simultaneously pursue close and cordial relations with all of its 
neighbors.  Without the U.S. security guarantees, the options are limited.243     
On the other hand, others within the United States argue that the ROK has been 
democratic for many years now, despite a few military coups.  Few nations have 
undergone such rapid urbanization and industrialization as South Korea without major 
social upheaval.  Furthermore, the U.S. military presence did not contribute to the 
successful transition of Taiwan to a liberal democratic state.  Therefore, under this 
rationale, a reunified Korea does not need a continued military presence to maintain its 
domestic stability.244   
A third line of reasoning sees the continuing presence of American soldiers as 
counter-productive because of the increasing anti-American sentiment in Korea.  
Additionally, a continued U.S. presence might also entangle American in factional 
disputes in Korea and ultimately damage the U.S.-Korean relations.245  Even today, 
despite the obvious North Korean threat, many South Koreans dislike the presence of 
American soldiers.  Up to the late 1970s, the U.S. military presence was generally viewed 
in a positive light.  Since the 1980s, anti-American sentiment in South Korea has been on 
the rise due to such factors as the U.S. culpability in the division of Korea, continued 
American support for authoritarian regimes in Korea, and concerns over the U.S. cultural 
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imperialism.246  While these issues have diminished, issues related to United States 
forces in Korea, environmental pollution, Washington’s hard line stance against North 
Korea, and the Status of Forces Agreement have been cited as factors behind the rising 
anti-American sentiment.247  In this context, to maintain a good relationship with Korea, 
Washington should consider removing its forces after the elimination of the North 
Korean threat.248       
The most important factor contributing to a unified Korea’s foreign policy 
alternatives is what the Koreans themselves want.  On the one hand, as previously 
argued, Korean nationalism may work against maintaining U.S.-Korean security ties.  On 
the other hand, Seoul may want to continue its defense relationship with the United 
States.  The Korean government may decide that the United States is necessary to provide 
protection against Chinese regional “hegemonism” or Japanese “militarism.”249  The 
current division of Korea has attenuated the Japanese-Chinese rivalry within Asia.  The 
DPRK has provided the Chinese with a solid barrier against Japanese inroads on 
mainland Asia toward China.  For Japan, the ROK and United States military in Korea 
ensure that China will not attempt to control the entire peninsula.250   
Currently, the United States policy contributes to Northeast Asian security.  If 
America’s credibility as a power within Asian were to diminish, concern over the rise of 
Japan and China may threaten the newly unified Korean state.  Following the removal of 
an American military presence from the Korean peninsula, the potential of Japan to 
expand its military in order to protect its own interests throughout Asia may increase.  
This would likely prompt China to augment its military power, potentially contributing to 
a Sino-Japanese arms race, with the Koreans again caught in the middle.251  Furthermore, 
while Russia is still fairly weak it still exists as a potential threat, either offering 
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opportunities for Chinese expansionism or because of the destabilizing impact of its 
large, albeit disorganized military.  The United States, because of its distance from Asia, 
may be the best, or the least bad, ally.  Since the United States is the most powerful 
nation on the planet, Korea as a medium size power, and most likely recovering from the 
costs of reunification, may consider having an ally that is powerful but far away is the 
best alternative.252   
Until the unification of the Korean peninsula, the current security relationship 
between the United States and South Korea is essential for continued peace and stability 
and remains a potentially relevant factor in assuring peace on the peninsula post-
unification.  The American security blanket provided through a continued alliance 
relationship will continue to make it possible for Seoul to pursue cordial relations with its 
three giant neighbors, while relying on a power that has no territorial or colonial 
ambitions in Korea.253  Absent such assurances, Seoul may feel compelled to establish a 
security link with one of its larger neighbors, to the perceived determent of the other two.  
This would be a destabilizing prospective, especially if it resulted in a Sino-Korean 
strategic relationship seemingly aimed at Japan.254       
 
D. PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Since the end of the Cold War, Beijing’s strategic calculations continue to focus 
on preserving a peaceful and stable international environment to ensure Chinese 
economic development and political stability.  Thus, for over a decade, China has 
increased its power and strategic weight in East Asia, and achieved sustained economic 
growth.  While the two Koreas do not currently possess the power status of China or 
Japan, neither are they passive participants in Northeast Asian politics.  Korean 
unification would cause the regional security environment to be reconfigured and would 
immediately affect Chinese vital national security interests.  For the first time in its 
modern history, China would be adjoined to a strong, unified Korean state, allowing it to 
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define new power realities in Northeast Asia in dramatically different terms.255  For this 
reason, despite Chinese security concerns surrounding the Korean peninsula, there are 
also opportunities to meet the PRC’s interests.  Beijing’s dominant interests in Korean 
unification center on maintaining a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula and ensuring 
the peninsula is free of any external military presence.  Furthermore, Chinese views on 
Korean unification, far from being cast in stone, evolve with the Chinese domestic, 
Northeast Asian regional, and the global situation including changes in Sino-American 
relations and the situation in the Taiwan Straits.256  
On one hand, many argue that the PRC benefits from the maintenance of a 
divided peninsula and a fraternally allied socialist state on its border.257  The 
reunification of Korea would potentially remove the DPRK as a buffer zone and a major 
bargaining chip between the PRC and the United States.  Moreover, by providing more 
aid in a variety of forms -- direct government-to-government aid, subsidized cross-border 
trade, and private barter transactions -- Beijing has played a more active role in 
promoting North Korean political regime survival.258  To the extent possible, China 
appears to continually invest only a necessary minimum of political and economic capital 
in its relationship with the two Koreas in order to enhance its advantage in inter-Korean 
affairs.  Thus, its two-Koreas strategy appears more reactive than proactive and does not 
appear to include a long-term strategic vision other than maintaining North Korea as a 
buffer zone by slowing down the reunification process.259       
On the other hand, China has been the major loser in developments on the Korean 
peninsula over the last several years.  The August 1998 North Korean missile test spurred 
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an unprecedented degree of military cooperation between Tokyo and Seoul, encouraging 
both an increase in Japanese military expenditures and a more assertive national security 
posture in Japan.  This incident severely undercut Chinese diplomatic efforts in 
opposition to the development and deployment of theater missile defense (TMD) in 
Northeast Asia, a threat to the China due to the potential of the system being extended to 
include Taiwan.260   
In addition, the problem of North Korean refugees escaping into China continues 
to plague the Chinese government.  Chinese leaders are faced with the unfortunate 
dichotomy of either upholding the PRC-DPRK treaty and returning North Koreans who 
enter China illegally or abiding by the United Nations' 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees, which prohibits the forcible return of refugees to countries where they risk 
serious human rights violations.261  From the Chinese perspective, North Korea’s 
reluctance to adopt Chinese-style economic reforms until recently perpetuates a 
potentially unstable situation in which China could be inundated with unwanted refugee 
flows, or worse yet, potentially drawn into another confrontation with the United States 
on the Korean peninsula.262 
In the current international political situation, Chinese leaders have recognized 
that the ultimate balance of power to shape the future on the Korean peninsula has 
already shifted to Seoul.  The active high-level ties between Chinese and South Korean 
leaders demonstrate this recognition.  Likewise, the ROK leaders have found the PRC 
more helpful in facilitating inter-Korean reconciliation than other countries.  In the past 
two decades, of the three neighboring powers, China has managed to maintain a more 
stable two-Korea policy, establishing bilateral relations with both states.263  Moreover, 
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the Chinese participation in the four party talks process, generally viewed as positive, 
reflects a continuation of China’s historical involvement in Korean affairs. 
A 1999 RAND study revealed that South Koreans heavily favor active ROK-PRC 
interactions.  In fact, South Koreans overwhelmingly see China as a positive force on the 
Korean peninsula.  A majority of South Koreans, seventy-seven percent, characterized 
China’s role on maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula as very helpful or somewhat 
helpful.264  The South Korean response no doubt arises not only due to the cultural 
affinities between the two countries but also because China has been extremely skillful in 
its diplomacy toward the Korean peninsula over the past decade.  More than any other 
power, the PRC has been influential in the inter-Korean rapprochement process, as 
reflected by the Chinese influence on the June 2000 summit in Pyongyang.  Kim Jong Il’s 
visit to China a couple weeks before the summit exemplifies the behind the scene role-
played by Chinese leaders in the peninsula’s reconciliatory affairs.265   
The PRC accepts, and in fact prefers, that it be given great power responsibility in 
the Asian-Pacific Region, in order to “rightfully” fulfill its role of regional “balancer.”266  
This was described during the May 2001 Conference in Shanghai on “The Political 
Economy of Korean Reconciliation and Reform,” after several Chinese participants 
emphasized the importance of China’s role in North-South reconciliation, which was 
categorized as “irreplaceable.”267  Furthermore, many in the PRC argue that China “must 
seize the opportunity…and further strengthen our position and function in our 
neighboring areas… and grasp the initiative in the management of affairs in our 
neighboring regions…to skillfully handle the several triangular relationships for the 
strategic interests of China.”268   
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Currently, Beijing views the American forces on the peninsula as a stabilizing 
force on the peninsula, one that has temporarily maintained the balance of power between 
North and South Korea.  However, the Chinese also assert that while the role of the 
United States is critical in shaping the environment for North-South reconciliation, the 
American “hegemony” could potentially lead to increased tension in the region.  As such, 
the growing differences between the United States and China could eventually create 
turmoil in North-South relations.  Furthermore, the PRC argues that the United States 
does not want to see a speedy resolution of the Korean peninsula because it would 
remove a rationale for ballistic missile defense.269 
In this context, the state of Sino-American relations contributes to the foreign 
policy options of Korea.  A diminishing relationship between the United States and PRC 
poses a significant problem for a reunified Korea, particularly if it chooses not to support 
the United States in a policy against China.  Regardless of Korea’s pro-American stance, 
it is logical for Seoul to have a policy toward Beijing that is sometimes at odds with 
Washington.  While the United States has the option of either engaging or severing ties 
with China, Korea does not have the option to ignore its most powerful neighbor.  
Furthermore, Korea has a greater stake than the United States in avoiding a confrontation 
with the PRC.270 
Concurrently, China’s strategic objectives and power potential in Northeast Asia 
are being watched closely by all regional states.  China clearly aspires for a central 
position in the future regional order, and it is increasingly willing to achieve this through 
semi-cooperation and effective consultation with its neighbors.  However, many of 
China’s regional neighbors, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the ASEAN states, are concerned 
about the implications of its emergence as a genuine power.271  Furthermore, with the 
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uncertainty concerning the power change due in the fall of 2002 and the increasingly bold 
rhetoric from Taiwan proclaiming its independence from the PRC, the Chinese are 
grappling with the complex challenges of maintaining political and social stability while 
moving the country toward a market-based economy.  Presently, there is no evidence that 
China’s goals over the next two decades are to dominate East Asia militarily.272  
However, the PRC does not need to dominate militarily in order to establish itself as a 
more powerful player in world politics and to obtain more deference in the region.    
China likely aspires for a stable, non-threatening North Korea that could act as a 
buffer state, without continually upsetting strategic calculations in Northeast Asia.  
However, the absence of significant, constructive change in North Korea may put the 
historical ties between the PRC and DPRK at risk.  While the older generation of Chinese 
leaders may feel an ideological and historical connection with North Korea, the younger 
generation, many of whom were victimized in the Cultural Revolution, regards the 
personality cult around both North Korean Kims with trepidation.273  While maintaining 
support for the North Koreans may be China’s preferred option, at some point Beijing 
may conclude that North Korea is irredeemable and that the maintenance of a divided 
peninsula is unsustainable.  At this point, the Chinese may seek to achieve the second-
best alternative -- a unified Korea strategically removed form the auspices of the United 
States.274  Depending on the Chinese role in the reunification of Korea, China will likely 
request the removal of United States troops from the Korean peninsula and the 
nullification of the United States-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty.  Given the 
circumstances surrounding reunification and the role of the Pacific powers, it is not clear 
what a unified Korea would choose to do.             
China’s active posture toward the Korean peninsula in recent years reflects its 
legitimate strategic interests on Korean unification, its concern regarding strong 
American influence following reunification and its subsequent effect on Chinese 
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security.275  It is for this reason that the PRC contributed to the shaping of developments 
in Korea toward reunification, not merely following the lead of the United States and 
Japan.  China has consistently used its influence to strive for peaceful unification of 
Korea and to keep a reunified Korea as a neutral, if not friendly neighbor.  Preferably, 
following reunification, the Chinese would like to ensure that a united Korea would be 
drawn within China’s economic and military sphere.   
Chinese analysts estimate that, after reunification, Korea will become a regional 
power with world influence.  The new Korea will likely be one of the largest economies 
in the world and will constitute a new pole in Northeast Asia. 276  Thus, a strategically 
aligned Sino-Korean relationship would be ideal for both states.  Since the first official 
step to enhance bilateral relations between South Korea and the PRC built on a desire to 
create mutually beneficial economic ties, this is a fundamental factor underlying their 
relationship.  As such, the economic relations between the two states acts as a central 
motivating factor behind the aspiration to strengthen relations between the PRC and a 
reunified Korea.   
Since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the developing Chinese market’s record-
breaking growth and tremendous potential has continued to provide an excellent 
opportunity for South Korea.  As the ROK looks for profitable markets, South Korean 
industries increasingly find the Chinese market’s promising potential to be more 
attractive than American or Japanese markets where South Korea has struggled with 
persisting trade deficits.  Moreover, modernization has played a leading role in the 
Chinese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula.  China’s modernization programs 
cannot be realized without extensive external support and exchanges from industrialized 
countries that provide advanced technology, capital, markets, and managerial skills, most 
easily obtained from its nearby Korean neighbor.277  A stable, prosperous Korean state 
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interacting with the PRC has a mutually beneficial market and foreign investment 
potential, thus creating a pareto-optimal relationship.278          
Another link between the Chinese and Koreans is the keen desire for national 
unification, an issue that has always occupied central positions in both countries domestic 
and foreign policy.279  Beijing has the daunting task of managing the reality that China 
and Korea remain the last two Cold War divided polities.  Given the growing chasm 
between the two halves of Korea, almost any scenario for Korean reunification has 
implications for China’s own unification drive.  The divided Korea has been an 
unwelcome factor in the cross-strait relationship between Beijing and Taipei.  Currently, 
Seoul maintains “unofficial” but active ties with Taipei, and even Pyongyang has 
established certain semi-official ties with Taiwan.280  Moreover, Korean unification 
echoes the similar ambition China holds regarding Taiwan, and the maintenance of two 
Koreas only underscores the fact that the China and Taiwan also appear to be going their 
separate ways.281        
Both the historical ties between China and Korea and the Chinese role in Korean 
reunification also provide grounds for future cooperation between the states.  In this 
context, China and Korea may regard each other as a counterweight to the increasing 
economic and military strength of Japan and the perceived threat of a reassertion of 
Japanese militarism.  The alternative -- a united and much more powerful Korean state 
under the influence of Korean nationalism -- would produce undesirable consequences 
for the PRC.  The unfavorable consequences would be of a greater concern should a 
unified Korea continue its military alliance with the United States and continue to 
improve its bilateral ties with Japan.  While the United States presence on the peninsula 
following reunification may help to control negative ramifications of Korean nationalism, 
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having the American military on the other side of the Yalu River would be intolerable 
because Beijing has a deep suspicion about the role played by the United States in 
Northeast Asia.282  In addition, some Chinese analysts have openly accused the recent 
expansion of the American-Japanese military alliance as swiftly evolving from a 
“defensive shield” to an “offensive lance” against China.283  
 Thus, a unified Korean state that sustains stability and peace on the peninsula 
benefits the PRC because it may eliminate the need for external military and political 
forces in the region.  In addition, a unified, stronger Korea may also serve as an important 
force in countering Japan in East Asia and to present a new multipolar structure desirable 
to Beijing.   Chinese influence in Korea could dominate, given the PRC’s strength and 
proximity, and the absence of a countervailing force following a withdrawal of the U.S. 
military presence on the peninsula.  This scenario is more likely to occur than a tilt 
toward Japan, given the geopolitically weak Japanese military and the mistrust harbored 
by the Koreans.  Furthermore, following reunification not only will Korea be strong 
enough to avoid becoming a Chinese satellite, the PRC has no stated interest in achieving 
such a goal, making a strong Sino-Korean relationship more desirable to Koreans.284   
 
E. OTHER STATES 
In addition to China, Japan, and the United States, other actors may play a 
significant role in the reunification process, potentially affecting the foreign policy of a 
unified Korean state.  One actor, the European Union, has considerable diplomatic and 
financial resources and participates in the KEDO consortium.  However, it is far away, 
and the Korean peninsula is relatively peripheral to its strategic interests.285   
In contrast to the European Union, Russia, which borders North Korea, has 
expressed interest in raising its diplomatic profile in Northeast Asia.  President Vladimir 
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Putin is interested in utilizing diplomatic dexterity within Korea to offset the declining 
weight of Russia’s military and economic capabilities.286  Recently, Russia has been 
improving its relationship with the DPRK, as illustrated by the meeting on 23 August 
2002 between the North Korean leader and the Russian President.  Following the 
meeting, Putin stated that the two spoke “mainly about bilateral relations with an accent 
on the economic theme, relating to the possibility of linking the Trans-Siberian with the 
Korean railroad."287   
Unfortunately for Russia, it currently has few financial resources, which limits its 
capacity for playing a significant role in Korean affairs, so it will not be able to extend its 
influence beyond a modest, supporting role.288  Russia’s greatly diminished political and 
military fortunes following the end of the Cold War are among the principal elements of 
Asian regional instability.  The disintegration of the Soviet Union weakened Russia’s 
military presence in East Asia, and it has greatly reduced Moscow’s stature, capabilities, 
and regional influence.289 
 
F. SUMMARY 
The state of the Korean peninsula’s relationship with each of the Pacific powers 
will have a major impact on its post-unified foreign policy option.  While the answers 
may remain unclear, it is essential to address the questions surrounding a reunified 
Korean state in the present in order to influence the factors affecting its future foreign 
policy decision.  Ultimately, however, the final decision will be made by the unified 
Korean state.  
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V.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The choice between Korean alignment and nonalignment following unification 
will be influenced by a combination of factors, including historical predispositions, paths 
leading to reunification, the peninsula’s domestic situation, Korea’s changing relations 
with each Pacific power, and the new regional environment, particularly the relationship 
between the United States and China.  The reunification of Korea will have far-reaching 
economic and political repercussions, not only for Korea, but also for Northeast Asia. 
How Korea reunifies and how the adjacent powers cooperate will effectively determine a 
new order in the region.  The United States and other Pacific Powers concerned about the 
foreign policy of a unified Korea can and should prepare for this event.     
Korea, situated at the center of Northeast Asia, has been a battleground of the four 
great powers’ contending strategic interests.  The Japanese regard a reunified Korea as a 
threat to Japan’s own military and economic security plans and are therefore seeking to 
moderate the growing imbalance between the two Koreas.  Russia also is trying to get 
back into the game in order to curb the growing influence of the other major powers.  
China has its own reason for its involvement in Korean unification, wanting to check 
American expansionism and “hegemonism” in the region while simultaneously 
increasing its own role, thereby effectively safeguarding the peace and stability in 
Northeast Asia under its watchful eye.  The United States, more than the others, views the 
three other players as threats to its strategic position in Northeast Asia.  The United States 
has attached a high level of importance to coping with Korean unification in order to 
contain growing Chinese, Russia and Japanese influence.290   
While the present North Korean threat continues to plague the political and 
security considerations of South Korea, the ROK has no other viable replacement for the 
U.S.-ROK security alliance.  The American forces stationed in Korea reduce both the 
likelihood of war and costs of defending the ROK.  However, following the elimination 
                                                 
290 Samuel S. Kim, “The Making of China’s Korea Policy in the Era of Reform,” The Making of 
Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2001), 402. 
85
of the North Korean threat to the peninsula, a unified Korea will be able to redefine its 
foreign policy options.   
Currently, South Korea has grown to a medium-sized economy, and the post-
unified population of the peninsula would be approximately 65 million people.291  
Ensuring its alliance with technologically advanced nations, such as Korea, enhances 
United States security.  Moreover, Korea has strategic importance to the Japanese, who 
are interested in maintaining the relationship between Japan, Korea, and the United States 
to maintain Japanese security.  A potential consequence of the removal of American 
troops within Korea would be to fuel Japanese opposition to the United States 
maintaining forward deployed troops in Japan.  Such an environment would lessen 
American strength and legitimacy within Asia.  This is significant because the breakdown 
of Asian equilibrium in the past led to many years of fighting and millions of fatalities.                 
More than any other power at this point in time, the United States can work to 
ensure the unification process will be peaceful and that Korea’s subsequent reintegration 
will succeed.  Not only will a peaceful and successful reunification of the peninsula 
benefit Koreans, it will also enhance the stability in Northeast Asia.  A positive and 
constructive American policy toward Korea, however, is by no means a foregone 
conclusion.  Washington’s myopic policy toward Korea during the past two generations 
has been regularly punctuated by disasters, unpleasant surprises and missed 
opportunities.292  Despite the benefits of maintaining an U.S.-Korean alliance following 
reunification and despite the potential threat to Northeast Asian regional security that 
would occur if the American forward deployed presence in the region was removed, the 
foreign policy options of a unified Korea are not a top consideration for Washington.  
This is even more true given the recent United States led war on terrorism and the 
possibility of a military involvement in Iraq.  
The war on terrorism could potentially bring stability to the Asian region, or it 
could destabilize a currently tense situation.  The present Bush administration has dealt 
several blows to the South Korean attempts at reconciliation.  After 11 September 2001 
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terrorist attacks, Washington’s interest in the Korean peninsula and reconciliatory 
measures fell by the wayside as the United States concentrated on the war in Afghanistan.  
Furthermore, in the President’s 2002 State of the Union address, the Bush administration 
incorporated the North Korean threat into its vision of an axis of evil.293  Since then, the 
U.S.-ROK views on inter-Korean reconciliation continue to diverge, and strong criticism 
has emerged from South Korea. 
A continuation of diverging views on Korean reconciliation will increase the 
South Korean tendency toward multilateral diplomacy, which could replace the U.S. role 
in the unification of Korea.  The absence of an active U.S.-ROK collaboration would 
encourage South Korea to look toward their neighbors for support during reunification, 
which would no doubt factor into the foreign policy options following unification.   
Based upon the historical relationship with China and the current attempt by the 
Chinese to bring about regional security, one viable alignment option for the ROK is the 
PRC.  Given the Chinese rising economy and military modernization efforts, the PRC is 
becoming a regional power and a potential strategic competitor of the United States.  The 
PRC’s regional diplomacy is highlighted by its continual reassertion as a dynamic 
security player in Northeast Asia.  Moreover, the increasing stature of South Korea in the 
international system would undoubtedly alter the historical dynamic of a reunified 
Korea’s relationship with China, thus making it more acceptable to the Korean people.  
While many authors disagree about the significance of China’s rise as a regional 
economic and military power, most agree that the PRC has become a major consideration 
for the ROK’s policymaking and United States regional security interests.   
A tilt of a unified Korean state toward the PRC would affect the balance of power 
in East Asia, an event that may destabilize not only Asia but also the entire international 
community.  Therefore, the PRC and United States should not view each other as 
adversaries in dealing with the tension on the Korean peninsula.  Instead, the two nations 
should build upon their relationships with each Korea and come together in attempting to 
bring reconciliation and possible unification to the two Koreas.   
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It is within the grasp of the Bush administration to take the DPRK up on its offer 
to improve American-North Korean relations, which would improve Washington’s 
chances of maintaining a security alliance following unification.  Washington should 
support the 1994 Agreed Framework, which promoted unprecedented cooperation 
between North Korea and its assumed adversaries.  Currently, Washington argues that 
North Korea is in violation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.  However, the United States 
has also failed to comply.  The projected five-year delay in the construction of reactors 
specified under this agreement detrimentally affects the North Korean economy, 
hindering inter-Korean reconciliation.294  Thus, the United States should seize this 
opportunity to demonstrate its resolve to obtain peace on the Korea peninsula, eventually 
leading to unification, by observing this agreement.   
Furthermore, the administration should consider toning down its rhetoric and 
support South Korean initiatives for dialogue.  Lumping North Korea with Iraq and Iran 
in an evil trinity is a fundamental misidentification.  According to the State Department, 
North Korea has not engaged in terrorism since the 1980s, however it does maintain links 
with terrorist organizations.  In addition, during 2000 the DPRK engaged in three rounds 
of terrorism talks that culminated in a joint DPRK-U.S. statement, which the DPRK 
reiterated its opposition to terrorism and agreed to support international actions against 
such activity.295  Despite its authoritarian political structure and its anti-American 
rhetoric, North Korea wants and undoubtedly needs to improve its relationship with the 
United States.        
Moreover, Washington should work to revive the four party talks and encourage 
North Korea to continue joining international organizations.  Once it was inaugurated in 
1997, the four party process provided an opportunity for in-depth interaction involving 
the Chinese, Americans, and Koreans to forward a practical agenda for resolving the 
Korean conflict and working toward future unification.  While profound differences and 
historical baggage among the countries in the region have made it difficult to find the 
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common ground essential to successful multilateralism, the obstacles have not blocked 
the multilateral policy entirely.  A number of organizations and institutions have been 
created in recent years that would be useful in a multilateral approach to inter-Korean 
reconciliation.  These include APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Plus Three, 
the Asia-Europe Meeting, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  In Northeast 
Asia, the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, and the Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group bring the United States, Japan, and the ROK together 
to coordinate policy toward North Korea.     
Without strong and continuing public support, it is plausible that the U.S.-Korean 
alliance will decay or dissolve altogether, which may set further strategic changes in 
motion throughout the Northeast Asian region.  Not least important, a United States 
military withdrawal from South Korea would leave Japan as the single East Asian 
country basing American forces on its soil.  It is by no means a foregone conclusion that 
such an arrangement would be politically acceptable to the Japanese electorate. Poorly 
thought out initiatives intended to stimulate inter-Korean rapprochement could actually 
trigger an unexpected and uncontrolled cascade of events, at the end of which the United 
States, for the first time in over a half a century, would have no forward military presence 
in East Asia.  Although many believe the likelihood of such an outcome is small, there is 
no doubt that an American military departure from East Asia in the foreseeable future 
would have major reverberations in international commerce and international security, 
almost all of them adverse.296  It is for this reason that the United States must work to 
develop and enhance a constructive relationship among all of the regional players in 
order to ensure a reunified Korean state engages in a foreign policy that will create a 
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APPENDIX I – MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Signed at Washington: 1 October 1953 
Entered into Force:  1 November 1954 
 
The Parties to this Treaty,  
 
Reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all governments, and desiring to strengthen 
the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,  
 
Desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend 
themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under 
the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area,  
 
Desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of 
peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective 
system of regional security in the Pacific area,  
 




The Parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved 
by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are 
not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations 




The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political 
independence or security of either of the Parties is threatened by external armed attack. 
Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the Parties will maintain and develop 
appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation 




Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the Parties in 
territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by 
one of the Parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would 
be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the 





The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to 
dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of 




This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of Korea 
in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force 




This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after 
notice has been given to the other Party. 
 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty. 
 
Done in duplicate at Washington, in the Korean and English languages, this first day of 
October, 1953.  
 
For the Republic of Korea:              
            (signed) Y.T. Pyun 
For the United States of America:  
            (signed) John Foster Dulles 
 
Understanding of the United States 
 
It is the understanding of the United States that neither party is obligated, under Article 3 
of the above Treaty, to come to the aid of the other except in case of an external armed 
attack against such party; nor shall anything in the present Treaty be construed as 
requiring the United States to give assistance to Korea except in the event of an armed 
attack against territory which has been recognized by the United States or lawfully 
brought under the administrative control of the Republic of Korea. 
 
Source:  “Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” 
U.S. Forces Korea [Online]; Internet, available from:  









APPENDIX II – AGREED FRAMEWORK BETWEEN THE 
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
Geneva, 21 October 1994 
 
Delegations of the governments of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) and the United States of America (U.S.) held talks in Geneva from September 23 
to October 21, 1994, to negotiate an overall resolution of the nuclear issue on the Korean 
Peninsula.  
 
Both sides reaffirmed the importance of attaining the objectives contained in the 
August 12, 1994 agreed statement between the DPRK and the U.S. and upholding the 
principles of the June 11, 1993 joint statement of the DPRK and the U.S. to achieve 
peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The DPRK and the U.S. decided 
to take the following actions for the resolution of the nuclear issue:  
 
I. Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors 
and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants.  
 
1) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. 
President, the U.S. will undertake to make arrangements for the provision to the DPRK of 
a LWR project with a total generating capacity of approximately 2,000 MW (e) by a 
target date of 2003.  
 
-- The U.S. will organize under its leadership an international consortium to 
finance and supply the LWR project to be provided to the DPRK. The U.S., representing 
the international consortium, will serve as the principal point of contact with the DPRK 
for the LWR project.  
 
-- The U.S., representing the consortium, will make best efforts to secure the 
conclusion of a supply contract with the DPRK within six months of the date of this 
document for the provision of the LWR project. Contract talks will begin as soon as 
possible after the date of this document.  
-- As necessary, the DPRK and the U.S. will conclude a bilateral agreement, for 
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.  
 
2) In accordance with the October 20, 1994 letter of assurance from the U.S. 
President, the U.S., representing the consortium, will make arrangements to offset the 
energy forgone due to the freeze of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, pending completion of the first LWR unit.  
 
-- Alternative energy will be provided in the form of heavy oil for heating and 
electricity production.  
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-- Deliveries of heavy oil will begin within three months of the date of this 
document and will reach a rate of 500,000 tons annually, in accordance with an agreed 
schedule of deliveries.  
 
3) Upon receipt of U.S. assurances for the provision of LWRs and for 
arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze its graphite-
moderated reactors and related facilities and will eventually dismantle these reactors and 
related facilities.  
 
-- The freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities 
will be fully implemented within one month of the date of this document. During this 
one-month period, and throughout the freeze, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) will be allowed to monitor this freeze, and the DPRK will provide full 
cooperation to the IAEA for this purpose.  
 
-- Dismantlement of the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities 
will be completed when the LWR project is completed.  
 
-- The DPRK and the U.S. will cooperate in finding a method to store safely the 
spent fuel from the 5 MW (e) experimental reactor during the construction of the LWR 
project, and to dispose of the fuel in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing in 
the DPRK.  
 
4) As soon as possible after the date of this document. DPRK and U.S. experts 
will hold two sets of experts’ talks.  
 
-- At one set of talks, experts will discuss issues related to alternative energy and 
the replacement of the graphite-moderated reactor program with the LWR project.  
 
-- At the other set of talks, experts will discuss specific arrangements for spent 
fuel storage and ultimate disposition.  
 
II. The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic 
relations.  
 
l) Within three months of the date of this document, both sides will reduce 
barriers to trade and investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services 
and financial transactions.  
 
2) Each side will open a liaison office in the other's capital following resolution of 
consular and other technical issues through expert-level discussions.  
 
3) As progress is made on issues of concern to each side, the DPRK and the U.S. 
will upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.  
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III. Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean 
Peninsula.  
1) The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use 
of nuclear weapons by the U.S.  
 
2) The DPRK will consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint 
Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.  
 
3) The DPRK will engage in north-south dialogue, as this agreed framework will 
help create an atmosphere that promotes such dialogue.  
  
IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime.  
 
1) The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its safeguards agreement 
under the treaty.  
 
2) Upon conclusion of the supply contract for the provision of the LWR project, 
ad hoc and routine inspections will resume under the DPRK's safeguard agreement with 
the IAEA with respect to the facilities not subject to the freeze. Pending conclusion of the 
supply contract, inspections required by the IAEA for the continuity of safeguards will 
continue at the facilities not subject to the freeze.  
 
3) When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before 
delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may 
be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the agency with regard 
to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear 
material in the DPRK.  
 
Kang Sok Ju- Head of the Delegation for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
First Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
 
Robert L. Gallucci- Head of the Delegation of United States of America, Ambassador at 
Large of the United States of America 
 
 
Source:  “Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [Online]; 
Internet, available from: http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/koreaaf.htm, 





















































INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3.       Air Force Institute of Technology 
Civilian Institution Programs 
Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 
 
4. Professor James Wirtz (NSWZ) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
5. Professor Edward A. Olsen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
6. Professor H. Lyman Miller 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
7. SA Rachel Ouellette 
HQ AFOSI/XONP 
Andrews AFB, MD 
 
8. SA Alan Ferrell 
HQ AFOSI/XOGO 
Andrews AFB, MD 
 
9.  SA Pearl Suntonvipart 
AFOSI Detachment 419 
Tyndall AFB, FL 
 
10. LT Kenneth Klima 
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
Mons, BE 
 
11. 2LT Jason Patten 
Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training 
Sheppard AFB, TX 
97
 98
